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THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET
AND PANAMA
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps one of the most serious issues in inter­
national economic development concerns the income differ­
ential between rich and poor countries. The evidence 
collected by some researchers on such variables as gross 
national product (GNP) and per capita GNP confirm the fact 
that a huge gap exists in the distribution of income between 
developed and less developed countries (LDCs). Poor coun­
tries have approximately 70 percent of the world's popula­
tion, but only 30 percent of the world's income. In terms 
of per capita income, the poor countries as a group have 
about $250 per annum, while rich countries have about 
$3000.^ It is doubtful that trade with rich countries 
would result in exports by LDCs large enough to narrow the 
income gap between rich countries and poor ones.
To a large measure, income differences among coun­
tries are a reflection of their structural differences.
1
2While LDCs export primary goods, the rich countries export 
manufactured goods. This suggests that there is a direct 
correlation between industry and development. Moreover, it 
can be argued that development is the precursor of economic 
development. Thus, one could infer from this that industrial 
development can close the income gap between rich and poor 
countries.
Industrialization based economic development may 
proceed either from import substitution or from the promotion 
of exports. The promotion of exports is the alternative 
to industrial development. This alternative will not be 
pursued in this study. In either case, however, small 
domestic markets inhibit industrial progress, and markets 
in LDCs are small.
Small markets mean low productivity and poverty. 
Private investment in any single industry is discouraged 
because of the size of the market, the lack of sufficient 
aggregate demand, and the absence of other industries which 
offer benefits (costs) from externalities. Small markets 
also prevent firms from producing the optimal output, and
so deprive them of the opportunity of realizing economies
2 3 4of scale. Nurske, Rosenstein-Rodan, Hirschman, and
5
Prebisch in one fashion or another took an inward-looking 
approach to the industrial development goals of LDCs.
Nurske says that low productivity due to a lack of 
capital results in low real income. The lack of capital is
3caused by insufficient saving. Investment is limited by 
small markets. To escape this vicious cycle, "a wave of 
capital investments in a number of different industries is 
needed."
Rosenstein-Rodan says that a big push is needed to 
"produce a 'bundle' of wage goods on which additionally 
employed workers can spend their income. In general, unless 
there is assurance that the necessary complementary invest­
ments will occur, any single investment project may be con­
sidered too risky to be undertaken at all."^
Hirschman agrees with the theses of Nurske and 
Rosenstein-Rodan, but argues for unbalanced growth which 
results from stimulating strategic sectors of the economy 
that would have the greatest impact on growth. Countries 
that are poor cannot afford to spend their scarce resources 
on all areas equally. This would dilute their resources 
and reduce their effective use. What is needed is planning 
which will maximize the benefits from the use of available 
resources.
The search must be for the unbalanced strategy .that 
is most effective. In other words, investments may have 
both forward and backward linkages. To achieve maximum 
benefits it is imperative to isolate those areas of invest­
ment that have both forward and backward linkages because 
their interaction will have the greatest impact on growth.
4Prebisch contends that the world is divided between 
industrial centers and peripheral countries because of the 
uneven spread of technical progress. Industrialization in 
his view is a part of the process of change accompanying a 
gradual improvement in per capita income.
The income elasticity of demand for primary goods 
produced in the periphery is relatively low, while the 
income elasticity of demand for industrial goods produced 
in the center is relatively high. The result of trade 
between the center and the periphery is a transfer of income 
from the poor country to the rich country. The solution 
to this problem as he sees it is import substitution.
In LDCs planning industrialization has been an im­
portant ideology. Because of their existing discontent with 
the results of international trade, import substitution
7
became, a deliberate official policy in the 1950s.
After WW II less developed countries (LDCs) became 
interested in economic development. Economic development, 
however, is an elusive term, and its attainment is elusive 
as well.
For the Central American primary goods exporting 
countries, the postwar period was marked by prosperity 
because of an unprecedented increase in the world price of 
the export goods of the Central American Republics. The 
benefits, however, from this price increase did not accrue 
equally to all of these countries because of differences
5in their rate of economic development. The prosperity that 
these countries experienced was not a result of an improve­
ment in technology or in productivity, but rather a result 
of an increase in the world price of their exports. Despite 
the gains in the export sector, some of the countries started 
to industrialize after the war because of the special con­
ditions existing at the time, i.e., a shortage of imports
p
and a war-caused isolation from external competition.
However, the smallness of the national markets of 
these countries had been an obstacle to import-substitution 
of industrialization. The LDCs which certainly include 
Central America fit quite comfortably into the classifica­
tion of the periphery defined by Prebisch. Since the 
periphery must depend on the vagaries of world demand (price) 
for their export revenues, there is a strong trend 
toward external imbalances to develop in these countries 
because of a tendency for a secular deterioration in the 
terms of trade due to deficiencies in demand for primary 
goods, i.e., raw material and foodstuffs. The obvious 
solution faced by the Central American republics was to 
minimize their reliance on the export sector for foreign 
exchange with which to pay for imports and turn their 
efforts to import substitution and industrialization. This 
scheme was perceived as the great hope in LDCs for economic
Q
expansion and development.
6LDCs equate industrialization with economic develop­
ment. For this reason, their economic policies are designed 
to accelerate the rate of industrialization. One such 
policy is trade augmentation within the confines of regional 
integration.
Industrialization and trade expansion are the goals 
of most underdeveloped economies. Despite elaborate 
schemes and proposals to achieve development, progress 
usually remains slight. Obstacles such as lack of 
sufficient leadership, capital, skilled labor, internal 
and external markets are frequently overwhelming. The 
creation of customs unions or common markets among 
developing countries has been growing more popular as a 
means for overcoming these barriers. There is no 
assurance, however, that, even if the political diffi­
culties to integration are resolved, the economic gains 
will be substantial. The Central American Common 
Market (CACM) established in 1960, stands as a model 
of the possibilities and pitfalls of integration 
among developing countries.10
In addition to promoting development through indus­
trialization, LDCs presuppose that trade plays a significant 
role in the process of economic development. The arguments 
concerning trade are conflicting. Almost all countries 
around the world accept the proposition that trade is better 
than no trade. But most of these countries have reserva­
tions about the proposition that free trade is better than 
restricted trade. The latter view is based on the belief 
that free trade can harm some countries while making others 
better off.
Since free trade would move countries to export 
goods for which they have a comparative advantage (goods 
which are cheaper to produce domestically) and import goods
7whose domestic opportunity cost of production is relatively 
high, support for trade restriction implies a rejection of 
comparative advantage and a belief in the efficacy of trade 
intervention.
Myrdal and Prebisch contend that trade works in favor 
of industrial economies and will lead to greater interna­
tional inequalities. On the other hand. Professor Harberler 
and Sir Alex Cairncross argue that foreign trade can con­
tribute to development of LDCs and that the gains incurred 
from specialization will be combined with the gains from 
growth.
Together these arguments are complementary in their 
justification of economic integration. The Common Market 
restricts trade with the rest of the world because this 
trade promotes greater international inequalities. But 
the Common Market members remove tariffs among themselves 
to gain from specialization and growth. Small national 
markets, however, continue to be a constraint. To overcome 
the limitations of small national markets, the Central 
American Republics had to integrate the region.
Integration means fusion. It promotes specializa­
tion in countries and regions and provides for the 
freedom of; (1) exchange of goods and services within 
the area; (2) movement of material resources within 
the area; and (3) movement of financial resources.
Also,
economic development of the region may be enhanced in 
the following ways: (1) by increases in the gains from
trade, (2) by more favorable terms of trade, (3) by
8more technical efficiency within existing firms, and,
(4) by creation of new firms and other economic ac­
tivities.13
"As the larger market makes new industries feasible and as 
the common tariff barriers are erected, the supply of capital 
responds to these new opportunities for p r o f i t . C o m p e ­
tition from freer trade will increase the efficiency of 
existing factor inputs through allocative efficiency and 
through what Leibenstein refers to as X-efficiency or moti­
vational e f f i c i e n c y . T h e  first process leads to trade 
diversion effects and trade creation and consumption effects, 
and the second leads to static effects because it relates 
to improvement of existing resources. The third and fourth 
effects are dynamic because "they add to the resources 
available for allocation and development."^®
Economic integration is justified on the grounds 
that LDCs are so
small that they could not efficiently begin the "first 
easy" stages of import substitution on the national 
level. A region-wide market was needed to encourage 
the establishment of light manufacturing industries 
on an economic scale. Without the growth of import 
substitution under a program of regional integration, 
the Central American economies were doomed to stagna­
tion and continued dependence on foreign exchange ._ 
earnings received from the export of primary products.
The general consensus about developing countries is
that although they share some commonalities, poverty being
the most glaring one, they are not homogeneous. Data in
Table 1 show that the five Common Market republics have,
in total, an area of 170,297 square miles, and a total
TABLE 1
AREA AND DENSITY OF POPULATION OF CENTRAL AMERICA, BY COUNTRIES
Areas Pop. Density
Country
2
KM'^ MI^** (In Mil) 2KM
Costa Rica 50,900 19,575 2.83 55.6 144.6
El Salvador 21,393 8,260 4.12 192.9 498.8
Guatemala 108,889 42,042 2.01 ' 18.5 47.8
Honduras 112,088 43,277 6.26 55.8 144.6
Nicaragua 148,000 57,143 2.31 15.6 40.4
CACM TOTAL 441,270 170,297 17.53 39.7 102.9
Panama*** 75,650 29,209 1.70 22.2 57.4
*International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics , XXXII , No. 8
KO
(August 1979), Population for 1976.
**Areas in MI^ from U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1962.
***Data taken from Panama en Cifras, October 1976, p. 40.
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population of about 17 million people. The countries
range in size from 8,260 square miles to 57,143 square miles,
and the population range is from 2.3 million in Nicaragua
to 6.3 million in Honduras. The differences are not limited
18to physical size and population. Furthermore, the coun­
tries have in common small markets, small industries and 
little capital. In addition, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) supported the Central 
American economic integration effort on the contention that 
the member countries were faced with a severe scarcity of 
capital and other resources needed for economic development. 
To ECLA,
coordinated national and regional economic development 
planning was the only possible way for Central America 
to utilize the resources effectively and avoid dupli­
cation and wastes.19
As suggested earlier, there has been an interesting
association in the minds of many officials and citizens of
LDCs that development and industrialization are one and
the same thing. Hence, some of these countries have even
20attempted to sacrifice agriculture to industry. But 
awareness of the potentials for development that agricul­
ture represents changed this way of thinking in recent 
21years.
In any event, labor (here considered homogeneous and 
unskilled) shifts from agriculture into industry. The 
supply of labor from agriculture to industry is 'un­
limited' (i.e., completely elastic) at the given urban 
wage (about 30 to 50 percent higher than the rural wage), 
owing to the relative size of the agricultural labor 
force at the m a r g i n . 22
11
Thus, agriculture can promote development because, aside from 
being a significant source of employment, it provides food, 
foreign exchange, and conserves foreign exchange.
In developing countries industrial development is 
undertaken under the umbra of protectionism. The postwar 
trend in international trade has been toward an increasingly
more liberal system. However, many countries have, in recent
21years, been demonstrating a shift in the opposite direction.
One justification for protectionism has been the 
infant industry argument. The tariff barriers necessary to 
allow for industry growth militate against competition and 
the recognized gains from free trade. Domestic industries 
fear foreign competition. However, they will have to engage 
in free trade eventually, although this step will require 
some adjustments by LDCs, if they are to enjoy the benefits 
from trade.
One way to achieve a modicum of protection is with 
the common tariff walls of a common market. "One of the de­
fining characteristics of a customs union . . .  is the 
existence of a common external tariff toward the outside 
world. It is the fundamental instrument of the trade and 
external policies of the C o m m u n i t y . T h e  external tariff 
has the effect of reducing trade with the rest of the world. 
This is a cost in terms of the lower-priced world goods that 
must be sacrificed for the higher-priced union goods. The 
union, customs or common market, derives benefits from trade 
creation.
12
On the other hand, apart from the welfare gains
from integration, there are other, perhaps less tangible ones.
In the works of Karl W. Deutsch, integration refers to 
the probability that conflicts will be resolved without 
violence. The Central concept is that of a "security- 
community," which is "a group of people which has become 
integrated": that is, they have attained "within a
territory . . .  a 'sense of community' and . . . insti­
tutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough 
to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations 
of 'peaceful change' among its population."25
Integration provides security and it can also en­
courage the flow of capital into the protected industries.
With success of the union more industries will appear and a 
market, with efficient production based on comparative 
advantage, may ultimately produce an expansion of exports 
to the rest of the world.
It is not enough for output to increase. More at­
tention has to be given to how best to distribute the gains 
from integration. The distribution cannot be delegated 
exclusively to market forces. The countries must devise
appropriate policies to deal with the specific aspects of
27industrial integration.
Any imbalance of benefits would prove impossible to 
maintain in the long run, and would militate against 
progress toward the common market. Integration agree­
ments could stem only from expressed decisions by the 
governments in which the distribution of benefits had 
been carefully w e i g h t e d . 28
Thus, the allocation of industries within the re­
gion is of critical importance to each member, but particu­
larly to the more backward members of the group. The sine 
qua non for the success of the union is an equitable
13
distribution of the gains from integration. Consequently, 
within the confines of the union, the proper management of 
the allocation of new industries may contribute to a more 
equitable distribution of income from development. This is 
not so on an international level where "big" countries are 
able to manipulate the world price of goods.
Within the common market, evidently, if the dis­
tribution of gains from the association is not perceived to 
be equitable, the member country which feels that is is 
being treated unfairly may decide to disassociate itself 
from the common market. The basis for the decision to stay 
or leave will depend on whether the gain from affiliation 
will be greater than the gain without. Distribution then 
will be very instrumental in ensuring the secular viability 
of the CACM.
The distribution of income can be assessed by an 
"examination of the trade balances of the members." The 
device for determining distribution is based on "the pre­
valent notion that countries with more favorable trade
balances vis-a-vis the other countries of the region are
29benefiting the most from integration."
Since Panama has been trading with the Central 
American republics before and after integration, it is useful 
to analyze the ramifications of the CACM not only as it 
affects the members, but also as it affects Panama's trade 
with the CACM.
14
On a number of occasions Panama had been invited 
to join the union and to participate in some of the CACM 
meetings. The country has to date declined any positive 
overt commitments on the first score, but has acquiesced 
willingly to the latter invitation. Nevertheless, Panama 
has entered into bilateral agreements with each of the CACM 
members.
With the obvious continuing interfacing of the 
country of Panama with the CACM members in various facets 
of international activities, it is reasonable to speak to 
the issue of the implication for Panama of the possible de­
cline in welfare (which economic theory says will result) 
for nonmembers trading with the CACM. The question thus 
becomes, what are the welfare effects of the presence of 
the CACM on Panama?
Purpose and Scope
The primary purpose of this study is to analyze the 
Central American Common Market (CACM) to determine if inte­
gration can lead to economic development in the less de­
veloped countries (LDCs) using the CACM (consisting of 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) 
as a special case. Development is defined here as an 
improvement in the standard of living of the people (i.e., 
improvement, in welfare) in a given country. In this study, 
changes in income will be used to measure changes in welfare.
15
Another purpose of this study is to determine the 
effect of the CACM on a nonmember neighboring country which 
trades with the CACM countries, such as Panama.
The analysis of the effect of economic integration 
on the five Central American Republics and Panama involves 
a test of Viner's hypothesis of trade creation and trade 
diversion. Viner argued that trade creation from customs 
unions is welfare improving and trade diversion is welfare 
reducing.
Several methods will be used to analyze Viner's 
hypothesis. The study will be comprised of seven chapters. 
Chapter II will discuss the history of the integration of 
Central America. The coverage will include the factors 
responsible for integration, such as the poverty in the re­
gion, its trade with the industrial world where payments 
for imports exceeded the receipts for exports, and the be­
lief that industrialization would prevent this loss of for­
eign exchange. The analysis will begin with observed 
changes in GNP and per capita GNP for Central America for 
the period before and after economic integration.
Chapter III will provide the theoretical background 
for integration. The hypothesis is that integration will 
result in trade creation and trade diversion, and that the 
net effect will be an improvement in welfare. Of interest, 
too, is the effect of integration on nonmember trading 
countries such as Panama. It will be argued that the effect
16
of the Central American Common Market on Panama has been a 
reduction in exports and an increase in unemployment in 
Panama.
Chapter IV will discuss the source and the quality 
of the data used in this study, and the manner in which the 
data will be employed in the analysis of the effects of inte­
gration on the countries forming the Common Market and on 
Panama.
Chapter V will deal with some informal measurements 
of the effects of economic integration. These measurements 
will be the GNPs of the CACM and Panama. The objective will 
be to observe trends in GNP before and after integration.
Two additional informal analyses will be an examina­
tion of trade balances and balance of payments data for the 
countries involved. It is expected that integration would 
have resulted in improvements in both trade balances and 
balance of payments figures of the countries that are the 
subject of this study.
Chapter VI will discuss two effects of integration; 
trade creation and trade diversion and their impact on wel­
fare. The income propensity to import and the export income 
elasticities will be used to analyze the trade gains and 
the trade losses that resulted from integration. Further­
more, the distribution of welfare gains on losses will also 
be considered in this section as well.
17
Chapter VII will develop the regression analysis 
that will be used in this study. The analysis will proceed 
from the functional form of the equation to the computations 
of trade creation and trade diversion.
Chapter VIII will summarize and conclude the re­
sults of the study.
We will begin the next chapter with a review of 
some of the history that led to the creation of the Central 
American Common Market (CACM).
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CHAPTER II
THE ORIGIN OF THE INTEGRATION MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
A HISTORICAL VIEW
The history of the integration of Central America 
began in 1821 when the region gained its independence from 
Spa]^, At the time of independence, a loose federal republic 
was formed because of the absence of the necessary "political 
and economic bases for a cohesive national organization of 
Central America."^ Immediately after independence it was 
quite apparent that the required economic and political 
forces were lacking for a cohesive national organization. The 
federal republic was made up of the provinces and other ter­
ritorial units of the old Capitania General de Guatemala of 
colonial times.
The Capitania General was not a viable concept 
because of inherent political, administrative and religious 
institutions that promoted disunity. Authority and responsi­
bility were delegated to the provincial governors by the 
Capitania General and by the Crown. The appointment of gov­
ernors was generally made by the Crown although the Capitania 
General had jurisdiction over some of these officials.
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Additionally, unity of Central America was made
difficult because of an unfavorable geographic setting and
problems with transportation and communication. All of
these forces led to the breaking up of the federal republic.
The federation lasted roughly from 1821 to 1840, during
which time numerous attempts were made at political unifi-
2
cation. These efforts were generally unsuccessful.
As mentioned above, political unification was made 
difficult because of the lack of adequate communication and 
transportation in Central America, i.e., the lack of adequate 
linkages among the various "territorial components" in the 
political area. However, communication and transportation 
linkages did exist with the rest of the world to a large 
extent because the Central American countries had over the 
years traded within the world market. The most serious 
problem which caused the permanence of an internally frag­
mented system can be ascribed to the economic policy fol­
lowed by colonial authorities.^
The problems stemmed from the Spanish Crown's mer- 
cantilistic policies toward its new world territorial claims. 
The Spanish gave the region its legacy and its tradition.
As in the case of the British in North America, it tended to 
be restrictive. "The primary and almost exclusive objective 
of colonial policy was to develop and maintain reciprocal 
trade flows between the center overseas and each of the indi­
vidual provinces."^ To enforce this reciprocal trade flow, 
high internal duties were established.
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It was not until the 1950s that very serious at­
tempts were focused on economic integration. After more 
than a century of unsuccessful efforts at political union, 
the five Central American Countries turned their attention 
in the 1950s toward economic unification. In the early 
1950s the ECLA was instrumental in forming some regional 
institutions in the Central American republics and in train­
ing political neutral local technicos.^ It was only after 
the Central American economies abandoned their efforts at 
political integration (the efforts were not abandoned 
totally— the Organization of American States (GAS) repre­
sents a continuing effort for political unity) and turned 
their attention to economic integration that a reasonably 
successful effort to improve living conditions in the coun­
tries of Central America was realized.
After WW II the activities and institutional devel­
opments in the region were encouraging. These institutions 
were fundamental to later efforts to economically integrate 
the Central American region. The institutions favored eco­
nomic rather than political integration.
Some of the activities and institutions, i.e., 
"establishment of central banks and development corporations, 
social legislation, tariff policy, etc., as well as (in the) 
relatively large public works programs and private business 
investments (that) have been carried out with a view to 
realizing the potentialities of the internal economies."^
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Success in these areas led to the negotiation of a "series 
of bilateral trade agreements among the five countries in
p
the early 1950s." However, as early as 1918 El Salvador 
and Honduras had signed a bilateral trade agreement. What 
was readily obvious was that the dimension of the market 
would be expanded, and purchasing power would be magnified. 
It was realized that if the market was large enough as in 
the other large Latin countries, industrialization was pos-
9
sible. Central American leaders like leaders in developed 
nations, correlated industrialization with economic develop­
ment. Hence, the logical inference of Latin thinkers and 
U.N. advisors in Central America in the 1950s was that 
plans and programmes had to be devised for industrialization 
which would culminate in the economic development of the 
whole region and of each republic within it. There were 
conflicting views about the merits of international trade 
for Central America. The prevailing view, of course, was 
Raul Prebisch's view of the deterioration of the terms of 
trade. It was also reasoned that the problem to overcome 
was small size markets. This could be done by means of 
economic unity, and industrialization could then be carried 
on within the confines of a common market. The aim of the 
countries had shifted substantially for now, they pursued 
"development of an urban, industrialized society, rather 
than of a rural, raw material producing economy.
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The basic concern of the effort of integration has 
to be development which would raise the standard of living 
of the masses. This process, apart from socio-political 
strictures, involves economic problems which must be recog­
nized and dealt with. First, the policy-makers must deal 
with "problems of investment, diversification of production 
and resource development . . ., (Secondly, they must con­
front problems concerning) strengthening of internal demand 
and more effective access to external markets for new and 
traditional e x p o r t s . I n  effect, what is accomplished is 
overcoming the limitations of small markets and allowing the
countries involved to gain greater benefits of economies of
12scale and external economies.
The elimination of small markets was achieved in 
Central America by the formation of the Central American 
Common Market in the 1960s. This development will be dis­
cussed in the following section.
Formation of the Common Market 
As discussed earlier, the 1950s marked the pivotal 
point in the formation of the Central American Common Market. 
With the assistance of the United Nations Economic Commis­
sion for Latin America (ECLA) the Central American integra­
lstion scheme was started. In fact, the role of the ECLA 
was very crucial to the integration of the area. ECLA was 
responsible for formulating the guidelines for moving the
26
countries in the desired direction. The roles of the 
United States and of the ECLA will be discussed later. Let 
it be said here that without the assistance of the ECLA the 
CACM would not have become a reality.
Some economists were convinced that a new perspec­
tive of the realities of economic growth, divorced to a large 
degree from the ideas of political union, may have been 
responsible for making the union of the Central American 
republics a viable effort. Mr. Carlos Castillo (of the 
ECLA) stated in this regard,
a new generation, more concerned with the realities 
of economic growth than with the niceties of diplomacy 
or the rhetorics of political union, had reached posi­
tions of power in the governments of the five countries. 
It was the vision of these men that enabled them to 
see far ahead and to conceive of the economic integra­
tion program, in spite of the complacent mood encouraged 
by the high export prices prevailing at the t i m e . 14
The main reason for high export prices for primary 
goods after WW II was overall scarcity. The high prices 
ushered in a time of prosperity. But these young men were 
aware of the shortlived nature and the inconsistencies of 
world prices for their exports, and so, sought independence 
from the world market by establishing a large market in the 
region of Central America for themselves.
With this backdrop and the fourth session of the
U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America which met in
Mexico in June 1951
The Central American Economic Co-operation Committee 
(CCE) was established to take charge of the program.
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and the United Nations was called upon to provide it 
with advisory services. The Ministers of Economy were 
designated ex-office members of the CCE. The Committee 
was set up as a body of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA). Advisory and secretariat services 
were provided by the ECLA Secretariat and technical 
assistance rendered by the United Nations and its spe­
cialized agencies, such as FAQ and IL0.15
The activities of the ECLA began in 1951 but it was 
not until 1958 that ECLA began to seriously consider con­
crete steps which would result in the economic integration of 
Central America. The four basic principles which would pro­
mote the goal of integration were (1) that membership in the 
regional market should be open to all Latin American coun­
tries, (2) the market should include all goods produced in 
Latin America . . ., (3) membership would allow the less 
advanced countries to enjoy special advantages in customs 
tariffs, financing, and other measures in order to enable 
them to catch up with more developed countries (These advan­
tages would have, of course, been eliminated as the countries 
attained equal development in the areas in which they were 
deficient), and (4) the market should be competitive and 
that steps should be taken to prevent monopoly and unfair 
practices. These safeguards facilitated and encouraged par­
ticipation of private enterprise which was felt to be in­
dispensable to the success of the market.
Castillo refers to the period 1951-1958 as an incu­
bation period. It was a period of experimentation and 
development of the concept of economic unification of 
Central America. ECLA was very concerned with industriali­
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zation at this time. During the first meeting of the CCE in 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras in 1952, the members stressed the 
need for promoting the principle of reciprocity. The concept 
of the principle of reciprocity involved the development of 
industries such that the resulting trade was accomplished on 
the basis of reciprocal interest. It meant that the other 
countries would participate in carrying out the activity and 
would also participate in the benefits and costs that resulted 
from it. If an agreement were reached to establish an indus­
try (plant) in one of the countries, it should be allowed 
free access to the CACM countries for its inputs as well as 
its outputs. The project would be a coordinated activity of 
regional interest.
Planning the scope of integration was perceived as 
imperative. This meant knowing the size and nature of avail­
able resources and the promotion of new projects based on the 
assessment of the available resources and on need. The 
bilateral treaties and fiscal measures would not be sufficient 
to achieve integration and industrial development alone.
In 1955, the Central American Institute for Research
and Industrial Technology (ICAITI) was established in order to
17advance industrial growth and productivity in Central Ameria.
"Also in 1958, the Agreement of the Regime of Integration
Industries was made for the purpose of building large and
18medium sized industries in Central America." The problems 
associated with the Regime were based on disagreement among
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some of the countries, particularly Nicaragua and Honduras 
versus El Salvador and Guatemala. The latter countries 
believed that the integrated industries should not be ac­
corded special privileges. The dispute was over whether 
free trade would apply to the products of the integration 
industry (plants) or to all plants producing the same goods. 
Guatemala and El Salvador, countries which were a step 
above Honduras and Nicaragua on the development spec­
trum, said that the plants should be accorded this privi­
lege as well as the goods. On the other hand, Nicaragua 
and Honduras argued that the privilege of free trade should 
be granted to the integration plant because after they have 
made substantial investments to serve the whole region 
(market), the market would be found not large enough. They 
will, therefore, suffer losses and also fail to realize 
projected economies of scale. The weakness of this argument 
was that demand for the integration plant goods should have 
been determined prior to the time the plant was put in 
place. Free trade privileges to the integration plant 
would have created a monopolitic situation that was against 
the objectives of integration. Monopoly power could cer­
tainly manifest itself in higher prices for consumers and 
an output that is less than what is socially desired.
The second period of significance in the develop­
ment of CACM was the period between 1958 and 1961. It was 
during this time frame that the "three basic legal instru-
30
ments of the Common Market were signed, although the last
of them did not go into effect until 1961 and was not fully
19ratified until 1963." The foundation necessary for the 
formation of the CACM was laid down with these legal docu­
ments .
The legal instruments of the Common Market were 
signed at different times and represent a progression from 
a free trade association to a customs union to a common 
market. The three documents are shown in Table 2. The 
first of these documents was signed in 1958. This treaty, 
the Multilateral Treaty, established a free trade regime 
by abolishing customs duties between their territories.
This treaty was followed by the Central American Agreement 
on Tariff Equalization. The objective of this agreement 
was to establish external tariff for the Central American 
countries. The Tripartite Treaty between El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Guatemala guaranteed free movement of persons, 
goods and capital between their territories. The General 
Treaty on Central American Economic Integration established 
a Common Market in the Central American region. Each of 
these treaties will be discussed more fully.
The Multilateral Treaty was signed on June 10, 1958. 
Its objective was the removal of internal tariff restric­
tions among the member countries. This was done on a small 
number of items initially with the proviso that the list 
would be expanded over time until complete freedom of trade
TABLE 2
THE FORMATION OF THE COMMON MARKET: THE TREATIES
Date
Signed
Place
Signed
Treaties Purpose of 
Treaty
Signatories
Plenipotentiaries
10 June 1958 Tegucigalpa
Honduras
Multilateral 
Treaty on 
Free Trade 
and Central 
American 
Integration
1 Sept. 1959 San Jose, 
Costa Rica
Central 
American 
Agreement 
on Tariff 
Equalization
Establish a free trade 
regime by 1968 by 
abolishing between 
their territories the 
customs duties, charge 
and conditions of the 
Treaty (Articles I 
thru XXVIII, plus the 
Annex A). Article I 
exempts products list­
ed in Annex A of the 
Treaties (NAÜCA) Uni­
form Central American 
Customs Moneclature or 
Nomenclatura Arancela- 
ria Uniforme Centro- 
americana which is 
used for customs 
tariffs and statistics 
(Art. XXII).
Establish a uniform 
external tariff for 
the Central American 
countries. Uniform 
rates were agreed to 
on a substantial num­
ber of the more than 
1200 tariff categories
Jose Guirola Leal, 
Guatemala;
Alfonso Rochac, El 
Savador; Fernando 
Villar Honduras; 
Enrique Delgado 
Nicaragua; Wilbury 
Jimenez Castro, 
Costa Rica.
to
Eduardo Rodriguez 
Genis, Guatemala; 
Alfonso Rochac,
El Salvador; Jorge 
Bueso Arias, Honduras; 
Enrique Delgado, 
Nicaragua; Alfredo 
Hernandez Julio, Costa 
Rica
TABLE 2 
(Continued)
Date
Signed
Placed
Signed
Treaties Purpose of 
Treaty
Signatories
Plenipotentiaries
6 Feb. 1960 Guatemala
City,
Guatemala
Tripartite
Treaty:
El Salvador,
Honduras,
and
Guatemala.
Guarantee free move­
ment of persons, 
goods and capital 
between their ter­
ritories
Alfonso Rochac, El 
Salvador; Jorge Bueso 
Arias, Honduras; 
Eduardo Rodriguez 
Genis, Guatemala.
13 Dec. 1960 Managua,
Nicaragua
The Central 
American 
Bank for 
Economic 
Development
Promote economic inte­
gration and balanced 
economic development 
of the member 
countries.
Guatemala Julio Prado 
Garcia Salas; El 
Salvador, Gabriel Pilona 
Araujo; Honduras, Jorge • 
Bueso Arias; Nicaragua, 
Juan Jose Luga Morenco.
13 Dec. 1960 Managua,
Nicaragua
General
Treaty on
Central
American
Economic
Integration
Establish a Common 
Market which will be 
brought into full 
operation within a 
period of five years 
from the date on 
which the present 
Treaty enters into 
force.
(Ratification) Guatemala 
Julio Prado Garcia May 5, 
1961; El Salvador,
Gabriel P. Araujo May 8, 
1962; Nicaragua, Juan 
Jose Lugo Marenco May 26, 
1961; Honduras, Jorge B. 
Arias April 27, 1962; 
Costa Rica, Raul Hess 
Estrada July 23, 1962.
w
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existed within the region. It was virtually the process
by which a free trade association was established in Latin
20America. However, all the countries did not sign at the 
same time. Nicaragua was concerned that new industries 
would gravitate to countries with the larger industrial 
bases. Economists have long been aware of the center's 
ability to attract capital, since capital will flow to re­
gions where it is relatively safe rather than to regions 
where it is needed most. The presence of other industries 
has external benefits which new industries can take advan­
tage of. In the smaller countries these benefits are almost 
always lacking. So within the CACM, Nicaragua believed that 
some countries, like herself, would end up being suppliers 
of raw materials for the more developed countries in the 
region if free trade was allowed to prevail. Integration 
plants should be favored and spatial distribution of indus­
tries made on equitable grounds to ensure development in 
the small countries. If an integration plant would provide 
the same benefits and cost no matter which country receives 
it, Nicaraguan officials contended, then the logical distri­
bution alternative should be to the country that could not 
attract the plant on its own because of its size and lack 
of a large concentration of industries.
The next step was obviously to devise a scheme by 
which a common external tariff could be established against 
the rest of the world. This was the Central American
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Agreement on Tariff Equalization, but it did not occur 
instantaneously. The tariff agreement entailed an upward 
rough averaging of the "previous tariffs of the five indi­
vidual countries. Uniform rates were agreed to on a substan­
tial number of the more than 1200 tariff categories, with 
some to go into effect immediately upon ratification and 
others to be instituted gradually over a five-year transi­
tion period.
The next important agreement was the Tripartite 
Treaty. As seen in Table 2, two important events preceded 
the signing of the General Treaty on December 13, 1960. The 
first was the Tripartite Treaty of February 6, 1960, which 
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala signed in Guatemala 
City, Guatemala. The purpose of this treaty was to guaran­
tee free movement of persons, goods, and capital between
their respective territories. The treaty reflected a strong
22desire to accelerate the integration movement.
The agreement set aside a period of five years for 
the complete operation of the free zone, hoping to break 
away from the traditional approach of freeing trade by means 
of a list of products. In addition, the treaty contained 
a tariff agreement and made allowance for establishing a 
development and assistance fund designed to contribute to 
integration and economic development of the countries con­
cerned. The Tripartite Treaty was to last 20 years.
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Development is a public good which is scarce. Its 
attainment entails a cost. Integration which is entered 
into because it is believed to promote economic development 
must be financed. Therefore, the Central American Bank for 
Economic Development was established to promote economic 
integration and balanced economic development of the member 
countries.
Both the Tripartite Treaty and the Central American 
Bank for Economic Development were influenced by a number 
of factors, predominantly political in nature, which limited 
the treaty of February 6, 1960 to three countries. "A re­
lated development, which directly influenced the signing of 
both the Tripartite Treaty and the General Treaty, was the 
decision of the United States to extend special economic 
assistance to help solve the problems of transition if the
Central American governments decided to establish a free 
23trade area."
The General Treaty on Central American Economic 
Integration was the final treaty and the most important one. 
Although the general treaty forming the Central American 
Common Market (as shown in Table 2) was signed in December, 
1960, the final ratification by Costa Rica was not made 
until July 23, 1962. "As of that date, the Common Market 
was c o m p l e t e . T h e  objective of the General Treaty was, 
among others, the full development of the Central American 
Common Market, the creation of a common tariff system and
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economic development of the entire region in order to raise 
the standard of living of the people in the various coun­
tries. This agreement was to have a life of 20 years.
Chapter Five (Article XXI) of the General Treaty 
provides, in addition, for formation of two organs; (a) 
the Governing Board and (b) the Executive Council. The 
Governing Board was made up of the Ministers for Economic 
Affairs who were the actual negotiators and signers of the 
treaty. The Governing Board's main function was to estab­
lish general policies to be adhered to for the purpose of 
promoting economic integration. The Executive Council was
required to carry out the resolutions of the Governing 
25Board. The Executive Council was responsible for all
transactions and operations that were designed to give
practical effect to the promotion of the economic integra-
26tion of Central America.
In addition to the Governing Board and the Execu­
tive Council, there were two other important organizations. 
These were (1) the Permanent Secretariat (SIECA) with a 
secretary general and a professional staff, to oversee the 
implementation of the treaties and other agreements coming 
out of the higher agencies created by the General Treaty; 
and (2) the Monetary Council. The Monetary Council's role
was expected to increase as the process of integration pro- 
27ceeded. It was also to act as a financial instrument to 
aid in the integration process. SIECA was responsible for
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supervising the implementation of the Central American 
agreements.
The planning for integration in Central America had 
the assistance of disinterested outside groups such as the 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The ECLA 
(founded in 1948) played a very important role in the inte­
gration of Central America. "A majority of Central American
officials believe that Central American integration would
28not have taken place without ECLA's participation."
The problem faced by the Central American countries, 
as noted before, was small markets, and the fact that they 
were producers of primary goods and importers of industrial 
goods. The solution to their problem hinged on the creation 
of large markets via integration and the consequent achieve­
ment of less dependence on exports by means of import sub­
stitution.
The success of the effort of uniting the Central 
American economies after WW II was due mainly to the presence 
of relatively young economists in government, for the most 
part trained abroad, "who thought that the main responsi­
bility of government was to better the living condition of 
29the masses."
ECLA hoped to appeal to these tecnicos by making it 
clear that their national efforts would not be impaired by 
economic integration.^^ The point that ECLA officials tried 
to get across was the regional integration would benefit each
38
country. That is to say, "industrialization and market
expansion would support, complement and ensure the success
31of their activities at the national level."
The ECLA's strategy in Central America consisted of
three main features. (1) The separation of economics from
politics. Political integration had been tried for one
century before without success.
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs were working to 
establish a subregional organization within the frame­
work of the United Nations and the Organization of 
American States. In October 1951, they signed the 
Charter of San Salvador to create the Organization of 
Central American States (ODECA). The foreign ministers 
thought they could approach political integration in 
spite of the failures of the past.32
The separation among activities of ODECA's Economic Council
and ECLA's Committee of Economic Cooperation was emphasized
when the first meeting of the Committee took place in Tegu-
33cigalpa in August 1952. (2) A gradual instead of total
integration.
By requiring that integration take place gradually,
ECLA kept the progress noncontroversial and low in 
cost. By forcing governmental delegates to keep their 
sights lowered, ECLA was able to make them concentrate 
on the technical studies and limited objectives the 
Secretariat had decided to p u r s u e . 34
Finally, (3) involved the carrying out of the program at a
minimum cost to each country. The ECLA was in total control
of the technical aspects of integration because it controlled
the purse strings. Subcommittees were formed to work out
the ECLA plans. These subcommittees were established for
the purpose of developing unification of international trade
39
statistics and tariff nomenclatures; industrial technology 
and research; electric power; transportation; technical 
training in industry and administration; and agriculture.^^
In addition to the subcommittees, the ECLA urged 
the Ministers of Economy to establish two permanent insti­
tutions. The Central American School of Public Administra­
tion and the Central American Institute of Industrial Tech­
nology and Research (ICAITI).
The United Nations Technical Assistance Administra­
tion (UN-TAA) financed the cost of the studies and provided 
the experts. The Technical Assistance Board created a group 
to handle the monetary areas of integration. This was done 
in 1952, and the group was made up of the Technical Assis­
tance Board, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), 
the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(FAG), the United Nations Technical Assistance Administra­
tion (UNESCO), the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
and the World Bank.
All requests for financial assistance had to be sent 
to this regional representative after they had been 
drawn up by the Committee of Ecnomic Cooperation and 
ratified by the national government. This enabled 
ECLA to maintain almost total control of the early 
stages of the integration m o v e m e n t . 36
The United States was not enthusiastic about the 
CACM because it was still more interested in free trade at 
the time. Yet, by 1959 the position of the U.S. took a 
turn. The U.S. gave technical assistance to Guatemala,
40
El Salvador, and Honduras, that eventually led to the nego­
tiation of the Tripartite Treaty of Economic Association. 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua were excluded from the secret
negotiations "because of their reluctance to proceed at the
37full pace desired by the others." Costa Rica signed the
General Treaty in 1963 because she wanted to proceed with
caution and maintain her traditional isolation from the
38rest of Central America.
In terms of the cost to establish the CACM, the
required expenditure by the Central American governments was
not large. ECLA's contribution in the 1950s was largely
"in the form of theory, promotion, and technical assistance,
3 9but almost nothing in the actual expenditures of funds." 
After the General Treaty was signed, however, "the integra­
tion movement developed sufficient dynamism to carry on 
without outside assistance. On the other hand, integra­
tion imposed a cost in terms of higher prices for goods 
bought by consumers, and the loss of government revenues 
from import duties.
Some Difficulties Faced by CACM 
The activities of the ECLA were not without con­
flicts. One conflict related to how best to allocate in­
dustries on a regional basis. The importance of the allo­
cation of industries cannot be ignored because it can be 
argued that there is a positive relationship between a
41
member country’s capacity to attract industries and that 
country’s stage of economic development and economic welfare 
from integration. The more developed regions like Guatemala 
were able to attract industries successfully.
The next difficulty involved treaty ratification. 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, signed the General 
Treaty before Honduras and Costa Rica did. This meant that 
the integration process was not viewed with equanimity by 
all the countries concerned. Some of the countries, the 
poor ones, believed that the benefits they stood to obtain 
from integration were not compatible with the benefits that 
the more developed countries could hope to obtain. Honduras 
and Nicaragua were particularly vocal on this score, and as 
a result demanded preferential treatment from the other 
countries.
The success of the ECLA efforts in Central America 
can be segmented into periods. The first period was from 
1950 to 1957, and was what Carlos Castillo refers to as 
"one of incubation, examination, confrontation possibili­
ties, assessment of possible consequences, and accumulation 
of limited experiences." The next period, from 1958 to
1962, "was one of rapid progress and far-reaching achieve- 
41ments." During this period ECLA achieved the following:
(1) It established subcommittees and held meetings with 
Ministers of Economic Affairs
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(2) It established the first regional institutions
a. The Central American School of Public Adminis­
tration
b. The Industrial Research Institute
(3) It performed major research studies on
a. General development
b. Transportation
c. Agriculture
d. Electric power
e . Taxation
f. Commercial policy
h. Industrial possibilities
(4) It was instrumental in the passage of these treaties
a. The Multilateral Treaty
b. The Tripartite Treaty
c. The General Treaty
In spite of the successes of the CACM during this 
period, the operations of the CACM were not always without 
difficulty. The allocation of industries and treaty ratifi­
cation were just two of the difficulties. Other problems 
involving Honduras and Nicaragua will be discussed in the 
following sections.
The Withdrawal of Honduras
The Republic of Honduras was as of 1821 a part of 
the Capitancy General of Guatemala and, along with the other
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Central American countries, made up the Central American
42Federation which was dissolved in 1838. This republic 
like the others in Central America was largely an agricul­
tural nation.
Before integration, Honduras' economic development 
was meager. "Five-sixths of the economically active popula­
tion was engaged in farming pursuits. Yet only 4,244,000 
acres, or less than one-sixth of the national territory, 
was being used in 1952 for pasture or cultivation."^^ It 
would appear reasonable to assume that integration with the 
other Central American economies would serve to promote 
economic development in Honduras by allowing the country to 
participate in the allocation of industries within its bor­
ders, industries which would employ people and service not 
only the domestic market but also the broader Central Ameri­
can market.
However, Honduras was a source of conflict from the 
start of the integration efforts in Central America. Apart 
from her argument in favor of a free trade for integration 
industries only, Honduras asked for preferential treatment 
from the Common Market because she felt that she was at a
44lower stage of economic development than the other republics. 
Moreover, Honduras was concerned that the Common Market bene­
fits would not accrue to her. So from the very beginning of 
negotiations on the treaty, Honduras voiced a lack of inter­
est in integration. By 1963 Praxedes Martinez, sub-secretary
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of the Ministry of Economy and later economic advisor to the
45National Congress, expressed the perceived disadvantage 
Honduras would have in the Common Market before the Common 
Market was fully operative and so could not be tested em­
pirically.
Most assuredly Honduras' position at that time 
threatened the very existence of the Central American Common 
Market. Gately talks about this within the context of a 
"game theoretic approach" in analyzing the motives for as­
sociation and disassociation (self-sufficiency) of the mem­
bers in an integrative situation. Specifically, he talks 
about the "propensity to disrupt" the union. He explains 
this for a given country as the ratio of how much the other
(four) countries of the union would lose, to how much it
46(say Honduras) would lose for refusing to cooperate. 
Evidently, a country's propensity to disrupt will be infin­
ite if the country receives less than or just equal to what 
it could by not cooperating.^^ It is obvious from Honduras' 
complaint that her propensity to disrupt the union was 
significant enough to induce her to actually withdraw from 
the union. The problem ultimately leading up to this point 
of withdrawal for Honduras was the conflict between El Sal­
vador and Honduras.
On July 14, 1969 El Salvador and Honduras entered 
into armed conflict. This meant some disruption of the 
coalition effort in Central America.
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Honduras was concerned with the industrialization 
process, too, feeling that the countries with the largest 
concentration of industries "not only benefited by the in­
come effect but also collected taxes imposed upon the im­
ported components that were definitely transferred almost
4  8totally to the consumers in the importing countries."
This problem was magnified when the San Jose protocol 
was signed creating additional tariffs of 30 percent to raw 
material imported from nonmembers. The tax meant that the 
price of goods to consumers produced with these imports 
would be higher. Honduras felt that "this new surcharge 
would result in a price rise on final manufacturing products 
with a bias against Honduras and with corresponding in­
creases in net transfer of domestic resources to other ex-
49porting member countries." Among the measures Honduras 
suggested to militate against these adversities was a side 
payment or (fiscal compensation to redistribute the benefits) 
transfer from members with a surplus in their regional trade 
to those in a deficit position. Decree No. 97, which was 
put into effect on December 31, 1970, imposed "the same ex­
ternal tariff to all imports from Central America that 
applied to the rest of the w o r l d . T h i s  decree in effect 
marked the withdrawal of Honduras from the Central American 
Common Market, but it also made provisions for bilateral 
agreements with Honduras and the other three countries.
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The disruption caused by Honduras has been a source 
of concern to the proponents of integration. In recent 
years, attempts have been made by the president of Honduras 
and the Chief of State of El Salvador to reestablish economic 
relations. General Carlos Humberto Romero, President of the 
Republic of El Salvador, and General Juan Alberto Melgar 
Castro, Chief of State of Honduras, met on January 7, 1978, 
to examine the future economic relations between the two 
co u n tries.Moreover, Dr. Jose Luis Bustamante y Rivero, 
the Peruvian mediator for El Salvador and Honduras, stated 
in the Honduras capital that there was a climate of concili­
ation and understanding between the two countries and that 
he was committed not to a total solution to all their prob­
lems, but, rather to bringing the two countries closer 
52together.
The reintegration of Honduras should depend on 
whether it is in her best interest to do so. That is, if 
the benefits from integration are at least equal to the 
benefits from selfsufficiency. Because of her relative 
poverty, Honduras had asked for special concessions (fac­
tories, market privileges, etc.) before the Common Market 
was established. Honduras may have been wrong in her assess­
ment of the cost/benefit calculus from integration right 
from the beginning. Even if the payoffs to Honduras are 
negative after integration, this alone should not be the 
decisive point. What is really relevant is the final payment
47
to the country. Gately defines this final payment as the
"payoff plus (minus) the side payments received from (made
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to) its coalition partner(s)."
The criteria for association of a country with other 
countries will be discussed at length in the next chapter. 
The point must be stressed, however, that integration per se 
is not always beneficial to all the countries, in fact it 
might be harmful to one or more of them. The harm may be 
factual or imagined, but the decision must be made on the 
most realistic basis and not just on some preconceived no­
tion that integration will somehow automatically result in 
economic development for the region as a whole and for the 
country in particular.
Nicaragua's Problems
The basic problem with Nicaragua, as with Honduras,
was her perception of the relative disadvantage she had with
respect to the other countries. The issue was one of bal­
sa
anced growth. "During the course of the Central American 
integration process, the concept of balanced development 
gradually emerged as an aspiration of the nations which 
considered themselves less developed than the other members.
In Nicaragua there was concern about the fact that 
the country was experiencing a continuous deterioration in 
the balance of payments brought about by a consumption tax 
of a number of goods. This tax caused a reaction from the
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other countries because they believed it was a violation of 
the General Treaty. As a result the other countries took 
measures (counter-measures) which brought a halt to trade 
between Nicaragua and the other members of the CACM.
Like Honduras, Nicaragua asked for preferential 
*
treatment, partly because of her balance of payments problem 
and partly because Honduras did. There appears to have been 
no real justification for this request because Nicaragua, 
for example, although in worse shape economically than 
Honduras in the early 1960s, proved that industrialization 
could be achieved in the union without preferential treat­
ment. By the early 1970s, and without preferential treat­
ment, Nicaragua had developed an industrial sector as
56dynamic as any in the region. This was a crucial point 
because Honduras had requested preferential treatment on 
the basis of a perceived disadvantage in terms of her level 
of development relative to that of the other four countries. 
This contention was not empirically testable as Honduras 
made the observation prior to the full operation of the 
CACM. With the advantage of hindsight and from empirical 
evidence, it is clear that at least in the case of Nicaragua 
preferential treatment was not necessary for industrial 
development.
Nicaragua, the largest of the Central American Re­
publics, had been experiencing difficulties with the other 
countries. The countries were dissatisfied with the quality
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of the goods produced in Nicaragua. However, Nicaragua's 
demand for preferential treatment stemmed also from the 
fact that Nicaragua and Honduras had a serious border con­
frontation which was resolved in favor of Honduras by the 
Hague in 1960. The conflict between these two countries 
carried over into the Common Market so that Nicaragua's 
request for special treatment equal to that received by 
Honduras was simply retaliatory. Evidently, Nicaragua 
might never have demanded preferential treatment had Hon­
duras not done so. Thus, the problems, although having
economic repercussions, stemmed primarly from political
57discord between Nicaragua and Honduras and not from purely 
economic causes.
The year 1969 was a time of crisis for the unity 
of Central America. Over the years there have been other 
problems, and the gallant attempts by pro-integrationists 
to solve them have not been entirely fruitful.
The year 1979 signaled the end of the Somoza Dynasty 
at the hands of the Sandinistas. At this writing it is too 
early to assess the implications for the CACM of the out­
come of the Civil conflict in Nicaragua.
CACM and Panama 
Panama is not a member of the CACM, One reason for 
this would appear to be the fact (as Cline and Delgado 
have shown) that the per capita GDP of Panama exceeds that
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of all the other Central American republics. A second 
possible reason is that the Panama Canal represent an unfair 
advantage to the other countries, because it is a source 
of income that is unique to the region.
SIECA has been trying to promote economic relation­
ships with Panama, specifically with respect to Panama's 
joining the CACM and concerning other aspects of develop-
C p
ment and activities of regional interest.
This study will also investigate the effect of the 
Central American Common Market on the economic development 
in Panama. Panama is not a developed country in spite of 
the Panama Canal and its higher per capital GDP rate of 
growth relative to the other five Central American countries. 
Development is a goal sought by the Panamanian people. It 
is reasonable to assume that by joining the CACM Panama 
could share in the benefits (as well as the burdens) of 
integration. It is, therefore, possible that with a certain 
amount of persuasion Panama may be lured into the union.
In the event this occurs, it would be useful to analyze the 
probable effects of the operations of the CACM on the eco­
nomic development of Panama.
It is quite likely that if the benefits without in­
tegration exceed the expected benefits from association, 
Panama will not consider becoming a member of the group. 
However, Panama may currently be enjoying the benefits of 
the operation of the CACM without sharing in the cost. If
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this is the case Panama may have a "moral" obligation to 
join. Alternatively, Panama may be harmed by the CACM, and 
may seek to minimize its costs by joining the union. What­
ever the situation, it is our purpose to investigate it to 
determine whether Panama should maintain the present status 
quo or join the group.
General Economic Development of Panama:
A Historical View 
An analysis of the evolution of the Panamanian 
economy shows that it has been the result of the cross­
fertilization and interaction of many factors. Among these 
factors are forces of purely historical character, struc­
tural changes, international relationships with other coun­
tries, and economic problems that plague the whole world.
In terms of the structural aspect of the economic 
growth and development of Panama, it is relevant to recog­
nize that the period 1858-1973 marked the time of the most 
spectacular growth. The factors responsible for this growth 
are rapidly being used up. The growth of exports of goods 
and services made a positive contribution to economic growth. 
Exports grew at an average rate of 13% per annum, particu­
larly export of bananas, shrimp, and the sale of services 
to the Panama Canal, tourist trade, and the operation of 
the Colon Free Zone. Import substitution in the industrial 
sector grew at 12 percent annually. However, the rates of
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growth were not sustainable because of a drop in the world 
prices of bananas and shrimp and e, no growth situation in 
the sale of commodities and services to the Canal Zone.
Very slowly, but indelibly, these decreases were conveyed 
to other sectors of the economy.
As an alternative to import of goods, import sub­
stitution in Panama was constrained by the limited size of 
the national market. The small market of Panama does not 
permit a very rapid industrial growth rate and greater di­
versification of industries at a reasonable cost.
The process of growth in one sector may be a cata­
lyst for growth in other sectors. It is difficult to deter­
mine just exactly when an economy shifts gears and accelerates 
as a whole to a new and a higher level of performance. But 
once the initial internal "spontaneous combustion" sparks 
the motion the rate of increase proceeds at a decreasing 
rate. That is precisely what occurred in Panama during the 
1970s.
In 1971 a staggering increase in construction was 
stimulated by accumulated demand and an expansion in bank 
credit, public investments in basic infrastructure, and by 
financial and commercial services. These positive aspects 
of development were offset by world-wide inflation, aggra­
vated by higher oil and food prices. The result was that 
Panama was paying more for her imports than she was getting 
for her exports. •
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Some Structural Changes of Panama 
In the decade of the 1960s, available data reveal 
the structure of a Panamanian economy that experienced 
gradual changes. The contribution of manufacturing indus­
tries to gross domestic product increased albeit at an un­
steady pace relative to agriculture whose contribution 
declined by one percentage point each year from 1961 to 
1963 and again from 1965 to 1967. The decline in the rela­
tive importance of agriculture continued into the mid­
seventies with the relative importance of manufacturing 
industries exhibiting about 14% to 15% share of GDP. In 
terms of factor costs, agriculture as a percentage of GDP 
was 30.3% in 1955; in 1965 this percentage was down to 
25.7%. In manufacturing the 1955 share of GDP was 9.8%; 
and in 1965 it was up to 15.0%.^^
Panama's economy is characterized in large measure 
by free trade because of her fixed exchange rate relative 
to the dollar, because of the lack of a central bank, and 
because the country is a net exporter of services. These 
factors have contributed to the determination of the struc­
ture of production, the pattern and volume of trade, re­
gional development, and trends in migration and the distri­
bution of income within the country. These factors have 
also contributed to relatively high economic and per capita 
growth, compared with other Latin American countries and 
with the industrial world.
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During the 1960s the expansion of the export sector 
ushered in a period of a 9.8% annual real growth from an 
initial $153 million in 1960, to $390 million in 1970. The 
greatest source of growth was banana exports, the sale of 
services to the Canal Zone, the operations of the Colon Free 
Zone, and tourism.
Internal economic activities complemented advances 
in external economic activities. Panama engaged in import 
substitution in the areas of light manufacturing and food 
products. According to the report on Panama's National De­
velopment Plan (1976 to 1980) manufacturing during the 1960s 
increased by 10.3%. Both the external and internal forces 
alluded to had repurcussions throughout the country. Ripple 
or spillover effects had therapeutic implications for im­
provements in welfare of an economy striving to raise the 
standard of living of its people.
Costs and Benefits of the Bilateral Agreements
Panama's foreign trade with the CACM began to grow 
in 1965 as a result of the free trade agreement signed by 
Panama with Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1965, with El Sal­
vador in 1971, with Honduras in 1973, and with Guatemala in 
1974.
Exports from Panama to the CACM countries increased 
from $0.8 million in 1964 to $11.3 million in 1974. Imports 
were $1.8 million and $30.5 million for 1964 and 1974, re­
spectively.
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Data in Table 3 show that exports from Panama to
Costa Rica, Nicaragua and El Salvador rose from $0.09 million
in 1965 to $7.6 million in 1973, while imports increased 
from $1.3 million to $16.0 million for the same period. The 
increase in trade involved mainly non-traditional products. 
This increase in duty free imports meant a revenue loss of 
$5.9 million from 1970 to 1973. Exports from 1970 to 1973, 
however, as a result of the bilateral treaties, increased 
by $2.8 million.
Data in Table 3 also show that Panama had experienced
an unfavorable trade balance with the CACM from 1964 to 1973.
The implication of this state of affairs for Panama was a 
drop in income.
The next chapter will be devoted to a discussion of 
the underlying theory of international trade and the theory 
of customs unions.
TABLE 3
PANAMA: EXPORT/IMPORT TRADE WITH THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET
1964-1973 ($1000)
Year
--------
Item
------  ■  ^ -----
Centra1 American Common Market
Total Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica
1964 Export 854 6 211 33 63 541
Import 1807 205 279 440 139 744
1965 Export 1000 33 284 79 119 485
Import 1982 116 262 438 178 988
1966 Export 2101 85 164 27 231 1594
Import 3095 168 181 584 305 1857
1967 Export 1845 84 240 45 271 1205
Import 4679 287 175 680 376 3161
1968 Export 2786 41 101 15 198 2431
Import 6570 837 308 871 486 4068
1969 Export 2803 131 62 31 197 2382
Import 7811 1315 535 718 824 4419
1970 Export 3003 171 141 50 359 2282
Import 10016 1686 703 731 1129 5767
1971 Export 3958 227 197 101 449 2984
Import 13137 2286 1067 837 1696 7251
1972 Export 5463 150 732 90 871 3620
Import 17420 2651 1759 1302 2029 9679
1973 Export 7945 191 904 203 1767 4880
(P) Import 21695 3861 2883 881 2545 11525
ui
a\
P = Preliminary Data Source: Inteoracion en Gifras. SIECA, July 1979
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CHAPTER III
THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Introduction
1 2 Economic theorists such as Ricardo, Heckscher,
3
and Ohlin, dealt with free trade and the benefits received
from it, and along with Edgeworth^ and Marshall^ discussed
the determinants of trade. The latter three considered the
possibilities of changes in the terms of trade which lead
to gains and losses in welfare. Kaldor,^ Scitovsky,^
8  9Stopler and Samuelson, and Metzler have presented argu­
ments in favor of tariffs as a protection devise to promote 
improvements in a country's welfare.
Both international trade theory and regional economic 
integration involve the movement of goods, services, people, 
capital funds and physical capital across natural and poli­
tical barriers. In other words integration and international 
trade involve the movement of commodities and factors across 
national frontiers. Trade is regarded as the most desirable 
and beneficial gain from integration and various aspects of 
division of labor constitute its underlying principles.^® 
Division of labor means not only the production of goods 
but also a way of organizing its production.
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The extent or size of the market places limits on 
the division of labor. The size will be determined by both 
political and natural forces, i.e., national frontiers, 
duties, taxes, and so forth, that limit transportation.
However, the division of labor will result in an
increase in output (income or welfare) because of the greater
efficiency of specialization. Specialization will alter the 
proportion of goods produced domestically. The good that 
has the lower input-output ratio will be produced in larger 
quantities and exported, while the more expensively produced 
domestic good will be imported.
All countries accept the dictum that trade is better
than no trade, but not that free trade is superior to re­
stricted trade. Since it is a foregone conclusion that 
countries gain from trade, the next logical progression is 
the determination of the distribution of gains. The terms 
of trade (or the exchange ratio between the two goods) de­
termine the distribution of gains from trade. What deter­
mines the terms of trade? If there are two countries A and 
B engaged in trade, and A is big, it will be a price maker. 
The small country B will be a price taker. Country A will 
be able to impose such terms on country B as to extract 
all gains from the poor country. An alternative presents 
a diametrically opposite argument. Country B being small 
will not be able to supply all of country A's demand for a 
good, say Y. However, country A can produce both goods,
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X and Y, and must make up for the shortfall of Y from B.
Thus, country B will specialize in the production of Y and 
import X. At constant cost, the terms of trade would be 
equal to the cost ratio in country A. This constant cost 
ratio will allow the small country to receive the entire 
gain from trade. If increasing cost exists in the large 
country, the gain retained by the small country will be 
larger.
If a country wanted to gain more from trade it could 
alter the terms of trade, i.e., improve the terms of trade 
so that it can squeeze the partner and gain for itself a 
larger share of the combined increase in total output.
The terms of trade move in favor of the tariff- 
imposing country if the latter possesses monopoly 
power in trade. This has interesting ramifications for 
social welfare, which now gets subjected to two con­
flicting pulls. On the one hand, the improvement in 
the terms of trade consequent upon the tariff tends to 
raise social welfare, and this welfare gain increases 
with the tariff; on the other hand, the introduction 
of the tariff impairs productive efficiency and tends 
to lower welfare, and this loss increases with the 
rise in the tariff. It follows then that there is a 
certain rate of tariff at which social welfare is 
maximised. This tariff is the optimum tariff at which 
social welfare is maximised. Evidently, free trade 
is not the optimal policy in the presence of variable 
terms of t r a d e . 12
Market failures due to externalities, taxes, tariffs, 
and imperfect competition result in a divergence between 
social costs (benefits) and private costs (benefits). The 
efficiency of the market in allocating scarce resources is 
impaired. Forced efficiency in the form of a customs union
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or common market "would increase the number of producers
producing the same or similar products, who would then com-
13pete with one another in a common market." The resulting 
increase in effective competition would lower both commodity 
and factor prices.
In his pioneering work on customs union Viner made 
a clear distinction between trade creation and trade diver­
sion and the economic effects of a discriminatory reduction 
in or removal of tariffs.
Others have built on this important work by making 
refinements to the model. Makower and Morton noted that
welfare would be greater the greater the dissimilarity of
15the cost ratio of the same good in the two countries.
Gehrels modified Viner's exposition by considering substi­
tution in consumption. He stated that
to examine customs unions in the light only of produc­
tion effects, as Viner does, will give a biased judgment 
of their effect on countries joining them. It under­
states the gains to members in a favorable case, and 
it may lead to unfavorable conclusions where a union 
would in fact benefit the members.
The formation of the customs union or common market
has very distinct effects on consumption and production
and consequently on welfare. These effects are usually
considered in terms of trade creation and trade diversion.
Trade creation occurs when a country which formerly obtained
a good from a high-cost producer now obtains it from a lower
cost producer. Conversely, trade diversion occurs when the
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country purchases a good from a higher cost producer after 
the creation of a customs union. Welfare for such a country 
is improved if the effects of trade creation outweigh those 
of trade diversion. Welfare is also affected when economies 
of scale are present.
One would expect that the large markets that result 
from establishing a customs union would allow firms to in­
crease capacity and realize economies of scale.
When economies of scale are present, an increase in 
output value can be accomplished by a less than proportional 
increase in inputs of labor, capital, and raw materials.
If the degree of returns to scale (sum of output elastici­
ties over all inputs) is 1.1, for example, a 100 percent 
rise in output will require only a 91 percent rise in inputs,
and therefore a windfall gain will have occurred equal to
17the difference of 9 percent of output (and input) value.
The gain will have a positive net effect on welfare, so 
that the welfare gain from trade creation will be greater.
If economies of scale exist and are actually realized 
with the formation of a customs union, they can lead to the 
phenomenon known as trade suppression. For example, suppose 
there are three countries. A, B, and C. A is the highest- 
cost producer of Xg, the imported good, and C is the lowest- 
cost producer of the good. If A and B form a common market 
that allows for the production of Xg with substantial econo­
mies of scale, the demand in B is met by imports from A
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instead of C , and the. demand in A is met entirely by domes­
tic production. B now imports Xg from A instead of from C ,  
which results in trade diversion, but now not from a more 
efficient to a less efficient source, because the economies 
of scale have made A more efficient. The price of Xg in B 
is reduced because imports are from a cheaper source as well
as free of duty. "The substitution in A of domestic produc-
18tion for imports from C constitutes trade suppression." 
Nevertheless, within the confines of a customs union or 
common market, comparative advantage will determine speciali­
zation and the pattern of trade as in international trade.
The concept of comparative cost is defined as the 
ratio of the production costs of the goods distinguished in 
terms of quantities of inputs. Trade will occur if compara­
tive costs are different among countries. The difference 
is reflected in a production function that is similar in 
various countries which have different factor endowments 
(Heckscher-Ohlin theory) or in production functions in the 
various countries that are the same as in the classical 
theory. In the classical theory, cost is expressed in 
terms of more than one input (labor, capital, etc.). In 
the classical version developed by Ricardo on the basis of 
the labor productivity that is determined by natural condi­
tions within each country, some countries are more produc­
tive in some goods than in others.
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In the neo-classical version, it is assumed that the 
capital-labor ratio differs between industries and that 
countries have different endowments of capital and labor.
Thus, some industries will be more appropriate to some 
countries than others. The tenor of the argument leads to 
the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem which states that a country will 
export those goods which use a relatively large proportion 
of the factor that is relatively abundant and import the 
goods which use a large proportion of the scarce factor.
Attempts at testing both theories are not conclu-
19 20sive. Caves cited Kravis who ranked industries by hourly
earnings of workers in Japan and in the United States, found
that the hourly earnings were almost identical in the two
countries. The data seemingly lend support to the Ricardian
hypothesis that comparative labor productivity differences
21determine relative price differences.
The Leontief Paradox resulted from Leontief's at­
tempt to test the neo-classical theory of international trade. 
The results of his study show that "America's participation 
in international division of labor is based on its speciali­
zation of labor intensive, rather than capital intensive,
22lines of production."
In contrast to the classical and neo-classical
theories of trade, Hirsch proposes the Product-cycle theory,
which enhances the importance of skill or know-how as a
23separate factor of production. Hirsch says that new
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product-cycle goods are goods that have been manufactured 
as a result of recent innovations and research-and-development 
efforts.
The neo-classical production function is distinguished 
from the classical in that the neoclassical production func­
tions in the various countries are similar because of the 
assumption that technologies are known and are universally 
available. Thus the marginal productivity of the factors 
of production depends on the combination of the factors in 
production and not on their location. In the classical case 
location is paramount to the productivity of the factor.
In contrast to the neo-classical theory, the new- 
product cycle theory assumes that the production functions 
are different in the various countries. This is true too
because of the high cost of international technology trans- 
25fer. These goods are likely to remain restricted to the
advanced industrial countries, because according to Linder
the consumption of products varies with the level of income
and will be most similar for countries at an equal stage of 
2 6development. All the characteristics of international 
trade just discussed are relevant to the common market which 
is best understood within the context of the theory of 
customs unions, which is discussed in the next section.
Theory of Customs Unions 
To understand the economic effects of integration, 
it is necessary to look at the theory of customs unions.
69
The theory of customs unions is a special case of interna­
tional trade theory. Traditional trade theory analyzes in­
ternational trade mostly by looking at two countries, but 
the customs union theory considers at least three countries. 
The theory of customs unions may be considered a special 
case of tariff theory. Discussions of tariffs deal usually 
with nondiscriminatory tariffs. The theory of customs 
unions deals with discriminatory tariffs because of the 
removal of tariff restrictions among members and the erec­
tion of a common tariff against the rest of the world. 
Moreover, the theory of customs unions studies the impact
of geographically or regionally imposed discriminatory
27alterations in trade restrictions.
The basic conventional assumptions used to describe 
the world of customs union are; There are three countries: 
A, B, and C; there are two goods: X and Y; indifference
maps of the individuals are identical and nonchanging, jus­
tifying the use of community indiffernce curves; all tariff 
revenues are redistributed back to the people; perfect 
competition is present in all markets (with the exception 
of the customs union tariff); and a common external tariff 
is present against the rest of the world.
The first assumption is justified because of pre­
ferential reductions in tariffs between partners, i.e., 
the presence of discriminatory tariff. "If a number of 
countries is to be assumed discriminating against other
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countries, clearly the minimum number of separate countries
2 8that can describe such a situation is three." Hence, two 
of the countries can agree to preferential tariffs among 
themselves, and a common external tariff against the rest 
of the world. Thus, A may be described as the home country 
which forms a union with B, and C will be considered the 
rest of the world.
Next we assume two commodities. Each country will 
produce both X and Y. At this point we have depicted a 
two-product, three-country world.
For the third assumption we consider that "prefer­
ences of different countries are reflected by a single
indifference map that is nonintersecting and has also all
29the properties of individual preferences."
The import duties levied by each country are redis­
tributed to its residents in a lump-sum fashion. Thus,
the governments of the different countries levying 
a tariff or paying a subsidy on some or all exports 
or imports in proportion to the value of trade, are 
redistributing tariff revenues to the private sector 
in such a way as to preserve a balanced budget.30
Since competitive conditions are assumed, the mar­
ginal rates of transformation and substitution and relative 
prices will be the same in the three countries and any dif­
ferences in these rates will be a result of the imposition 
of tariffs and subsidies.
The common tariff erected against country C, i.e., 
the rest of the world, may be one of three kinds; (1) the
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union may adopt the lower of the two initial tariffs (lower 
level of protection), (2) the union may adopt the higher of 
the two initial tariffs (higher level of protection) , or
(3) the union may adopt an average of the two initial tar­
iffs.
Without too much elaboration here the conclusion^^ 
depends on the form of tariff that is adopted by the union.
In the first case, the adoption of the lower of the two 
initial tariffs creates trade, and benefits the initially 
high-tariff country and leaves unaltered the wellbeing of 
the lower-tariff country. If the tariff is the higher of 
the two initial tariffs, the result will be an extinction 
of trade.
The third possibility implies that
there always exists a common duty of intermediate 
magnitude which leaves unchanged the volume and direc­
tion of foreign trade. The rate of duty which leaves 
trade unchanged in referred to as a critical rate. If 
that critical , rate is adopted the country with the 
initially high duty will benefit from the union; pos­
sibly both members will benefit.32
Traditional trade theory holds that free trade is 
superior to restricted trade. This assertion justifies any 
movement away from distortions in international trade to 
free international trade because such a move will take ad­
vantage of differences in comparative costs and promote 
specialization and an improvement in global output and welfare.
However, international trade may lead to problems 
that must be dealt with or recognized before a reconsidéra-
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tion or modification of traditional trade theory can be 
pursued. The trading partners indeed gain from trade which 
should promote economic development and growth. But, when 
industrial nations trade with primary goods exporting econo­
mies, the former pay a lower price to the latter for their 
exports. That is, the primary goods exporting countries
must pay more for their imports than they get for their ex- 
3 3ports. This means that the exports of the countries'
primary goods cannot pay for their imports— there is a gap
34between export receipts and import payments. The logical 
conclusion from this discrepancy is the creation of tariff 
walls behind which industrial goods may be manufactured 
domestically. However, the domestic market may be too small; 
therefore, economic integration with other less developed 
countries would overcome this dilemma of small markets.
The move toward integration, nevertheless, has two 
possible effects. It may lead to an improvement or a reduc­
tion in welfare. The other possibility, however, is that 
if we consider only the production effect, the outcome is 
in favor of gains from union activities rather than losses. 
The net effect of trade creation and trade diversion in 
this case is positive.
This analysis applies to a two-commodity-three- 
country model. It can be shown, however, that if we use 
three commodities the outcome is indeterminate. In the two- 
commodity case, there is one optimum solution (or level of
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consumption and production) which is achieved when the 
relative prices of the two commodities are equal. However, 
a customs union involves goods from the rest of the world, 
the home country, and partners. When this possibility is 
considered, the conclusion of a general presumption of gain 
from integration vanishes.
Table 4 shows that the movement from an ad valorem 
tariff on all imports to the formation of a customs union 
with country B results in some efficiency between the part­
ners, but leads to inefficiency in trade with the rest of 
the world. This is the result of Lancaster and Lipsey's 
theory of the second best.
The Theory of the Second Best
Integration in a region such as Central America is 
a movement closer to universal free trade. Couched behind 
this movement is the accepted view that this will improve 
welfare because it eliminates tariffs among the members.
But this is not necessarily true as Viner has shown. Trade 
creation may result in improved welfare and trade diversion 
may lead to welfare reduction. This is the contribution 
of the theory of customs union to the development of the 
theory of the second best.
The best static solution, assuming a competitive 
world economy, is universal free trade because that 
will satisfy the Pareto optimum conditions. A customs 
union represents a step toward universal free trade 
since it expands the area of free trade. But it does 
not necessarily increase aggregate welfare by bringing 
the world closer to the best s o l u t i o n . 35
TABLE 4 
TRADE INVOLVING THREE GOODS
Free Trade 
(Col. 1)
Uniform Ad Valorem Tariff 
On All Imports 
(Col. 2)
Customs Union 
With Country B 
(Col. 3)
^Ad ^Ai ^Ad  ^^Ai ^Ad ^Ai
‘ -Bi
^Ad ^Ai ^Ad , ^Ai ^Ad , ^Ai
-ca
^Bd ^Bi ^Bd ^Bi ^Bd
^Cd ^Ci ^Cd
Where A, B, and C are countries: d is the domestic price in B including tariff, 
i refers to the price in the international market.
This analysis is taken from R. G. Lipsey,"The Theory of Customs Unions: A General
Survey," Economic Journal. 70 (September, 1960), pp. 495-513.
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If all conditions of optimality are met, a positive 
social dividend will always be achieved. However, if all 
the conditions for a Pareto optimal solution are not realized, 
a change that increases the number of conditions fulfilled 
does not lead to a positive social dividend, i.e., increase 
in welfare.
The theory of the second best has been used to 
question the desirability of policies which attempt to 
attain the Pareto conditions on a piecemeal basis for 
markets considered in isolation. The counter argument 
to this is that, though piecemeal policy is not valid 
in general, it is valid for many specific c a s e s . 37
The analysis for customs unions is expanded to in­
corporate common markets. Hence, the common market does not 
necessarily result in a positive social dividend, although 
it increases the number of conditions for the Pareto optimal 
solution. The problem is that integration has benefits as 
well as costs and under certain conditions the costs may be 
greater than the benefits. (For additional information on 
the theory of the second best see footnote 38.) The second 
best theory suggests that other options to free trade are 
available. Some of these options are discussed in the fol­
lowing section.
Stages of Economic Integration
There are a number of options available to countries 
desiring economic integration. The economics literature 
provides the following classification.
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A free-trade area. In this particular system the 
countries agree to gradually eliminate tariffs among them­
selves. Each country is allowed to retain the right to 
establish its own tariff against non-members.
A customs union. This represents the second highest 
state in the classification and it is characterized by the 
inclusion of the provisions of the free-trade area, with the 
addition that the countries set up a common tariff policy 
against the rest of the world.
A common market. The common market includes the 
agreements contained in a customs union, but it adds a fur­
ther dimension to economic integration. It allows for free 
movement of factors among the members of the integrated area.
An economic union. This stage of integration in­
cludes all the steps in the previous three and adds "accord­
ing to certain economists, some degree of harmonization in
national economic policies in order to remove discrimination
39that arose out of disparities in these policies." The 
implication is that the area should operate as if it were 
one.4°
Total economic integration. Total economic inte­
gration is the ideal form of integration that contains in 
the agreement tariff elimination among the members, a common 
external tariff policy, free factor movement and harmoniza­
tion of economic policies as well as unification of monetary, 
fiscal, credit, social, and countercyclical policies.
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The phases of economic integration do not end at 
total economic integration. An economic community such as 
the European Economic Community may evolve to an economic 
and political situation where supranationality prevails.
Maritano outlines various other possibilities for 
integration such as national and regional,vertical and hori­
zontal integration, in addition to sectorial, boarding, and
41physical integration.
If the highest form of economic integration is the 
ideal form or phase, the countries beginning at the first 
stage should gravitate to this ideal form. Integration 
should be dynamic, not only changing the goods and factor 
movements among countries, but should include harmonization 
and unification goals as well. Since universal free trade 
is not available, the areas of free trade areas dispersed 
around the globe should approximate global free trade. Yet, 
we must recognize the second-best nature of this alterna­
tive, realizing that welfare may not improve as a result of 
economic integration.
The Costs and Benefits of Economic Integration
The process of integration involves an opportunity
cost if the countries involved are "forced" to replace higher-
42cost sources of supply for lower-cost sources. For example, 
suppose the money prices of a single commodity X in three 
countries is as shown in the following table;
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TABLE 5
MONEY PRICES OF A SINGLE COMMODITY (X) 
IN THREE COUNTRIES
Country A B C
Price $35 $25 $20
A tariff of 100% is levied by country A, the home
country, to protect its'domestic industry producing good X. 
If the home country forms a customs union with either B or 
C, it will be better off. However, suppose A had been 
levying a nondiscriminatory tariff of 50%, she would have 
been buying from country C, the lowest cost supplier. A 
customs union with B would mean that B would be exempt from 
the 50% tariff and A would import commodity X from B at a
cost of $25. Country C, however, must supply X at a price
of $30. In terms of export value, A must buy commodity X 
from B at a price of $25, whereas country C formerly pro­
vided it at $20. This is Viner's example of trade diver­
sion.^^ The "higher-cost production within the union may 
displace lower-cost production in countries outside the
union, with the result that world output is reduced and some
44countries within the union are made worse off."
The economic coalition may be stymied by trade di­
version as the countries that are made worse off demand
79
preferential treatment as did Honduras (because of real or 
imagined injury), or threaten withdrawal from the union.
On the other hand, the objective of integration is 
sought because of the welfare creating possibility of trade 
creation and trade diversion. In general one may assume 
that integration that results in trade creation leads to 
improvement in welfare. Yu and Scully^^ have eloquently 
demonstrated the Lipsey-Gehrels theorem discussed above as 
follows ;
Let “ A's outputs of the 2 commodities
1  and 2 .
A's national income expressed in terms of commodity
2  is;
(1) I = PX^ + Xg
Where p = p^/pg = terms of trade
(2) dXg/dx^ = -P = production possibilities
(3) I = P*X^ + Xg +[t/(l + t) Eg]
Where [t/(1 + tJjEg is the tariff proceeds; Eg
is the excess demand for the imported good
(Eg = dg - Xg); and p* = A's internal price ratio
The effect of the tariff on A's national income is known
from the derivative of national income with respect to the 
46tariff by Kemp as follows:
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(4) dl/dt = (dp*/dt)d^ + t/(l + t) p^fdXg/dp* -
dx/p*) / 1  + t(l - nig) 
where = MPC of the imported good 
dp*/dt = -p/(l + t)
d^ = domestic demand for good i, and i = 1 , 2
Xg = Noninferior good, so 0 < mg< 1, and the
denominator in the last term of equation 4 
is positive 
dXg/dp* < 0; 3dg/3p* > 0.
Therefore dl/dt < 0, and the imposition of a tariff on C 
lowers A's national income.
If A forms a trade-diverting customs union with B,
(5) dl/dp = x^ > 0.
Thus a decline in A's terms of trade will lower A's 
income. So trade diversion is income reducing.
The loss from trade diversion depends on the magni­
tude of the deterioration in the term of trade. Assume at 
p',- = -Al^y so the formation of a trade-diverting
customs union with terms of trade p ' leaves A's national 
income unchanged. However, at p" > p ' A's national income 
will increase, proving that a trade diverting customs union 
may lead to an increase in welfare.
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In terms of a tariff against C the extent of the 
loss in national income depends on the size of the tariff 
rate. After the imposition of a tariff, national income 
declines from to I^. The loss in national income becomes
-Alt = :t - lo"
Yu and Scully have also demonstrated mathematically 
that in the presence of domestic distortions, trade creation 
may be welfare reducing and trade diversion may be welfare im­
proving. It is interesting to note that although integra­
tion may promote growth, in a number of studies Yu,^^
48 49Batra, and Bhagwati have demonstrated that growth may
have a negative effect on welfare when factor distortions 
or price changes are present. We shall not pursue this 
point here. What we will be discussing is how to best im­
prove welfare. Gains in welfare may be affected by the kind 
of countries which form partnerships.
The literature is replete with discussions concern­
ing the gains from customs union. Markower and Morton 
noted that "given that trade creation was going to occur" 
from integration, the gains would be greater the greater
the dissimilarity between their cost ratios in the two
^ . 50countries.
It is worth noting that countries with similar cost 
ratios are competitive economies and the gains from inte­
gration will be small. However, complementary economies 
have dissimilar cost ratios and thus integration will lead
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to higher gains. This analysis applies to two countries 
producing the same goods. But countries that have extremely 
different stages of development present an entirely differ­
ent problem. If one country is highly developed and the 
other is not, trade may tend to benefit the highly developed 
country at the expense of the less developed country. Cline 
has noted for the Latin American economies that differences 
in income may lead to import substitution by the less de­
veloped country.
Complementary economies as noted above are those 
with different patterns of production or costs ratios, and 
thus, each specializes in the production of the good with 
the lowest cost. Rival economies have similar cost ratios 
or patterns of production. So the costs of producing each 
good is greater among complementary economies than among 
rival ones. Thus, it follows that complementary economies 
will yield greater savings in costs.
The opposite argument is that competitive economies
yield greater gains. Viner argued that rival economies will
52lead to greater welfare because of greater trade creation.
In reconciling these arguments, Makower and Morton
noted that "if trade creation does occur, the gains will
be greater the greater the difference in production costs
in the two countries for goods involved in trade creation,
53a conclusion with which Viner specifically agrees."
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The tenor of Viner's contention can be illustrated 
in the following way. Assume that there are two groups of 
commodities x and y. One group, say x, is produced by all 
the countries, A, B, C, and D. The second group y is pro­
duced by countries C and D. Next, assume that a union is 
formed consisting of countries A, B, and C. D is the rest 
of the world. The most efficient producer of x in the union 
will capture the market. This is an example of trade crea­
tion. The one country C which produces y will capture the 
market for y . If D is a more efficient producer of y , then 
the shift from the low cost supplier to the higher cost 
producer, i.e., country C, will be an example of trade di­
version which reduces the efficiency of resource use. If 
A, B, and C are rival economies, they will have relatively 
more x. So integration in this case will lead to more trade 
creation than trade diversion, the net effect being an 
increase in welfare.
Terms of Trade and Offer Curves 
The offer curve is used to describe the equilibrium 
between three countries trading in two goods. The coun­
tries forming a union will have excess offer curves for the 
situation in which they have tariffs and one in which they 
do not for each of the goods.
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FIGURE 1
U represents the union offer curve 
C represents country C's offer curve 
Ep is the pre-union equilibrium. After integration, a com­
mon tariff is imposed against C. This leads to a worsening 
of the terms of trade for C (slope OE^) and the union re­
sults in an improvement in B's terms of trade, but a worsen­
ing in A's terms of trade. However, the shift of the 
equilibrium for Ep to E^ reflects the discrimination against 
country C and the reduced trade of union countries with C.
The greater the common tariff on nonmember goods, the greater 
the discrimination and trade diversion. "Although country 
A's terms of trade worsened, it benefits from trade expansion—
it will export more of x to country B. „54
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Throughout this study, the proposition of worsening 
terms of trade of the LDC's vis-a-vis developed countries 
in matters relating to trade has been taken for granted. 
However, it can be shown that this proposition is not 
unique. The past five years have witnessed the steady rise 
in the price of oil coming from LDCs (OPEC, Mexico) to de­
veloped countries. This phenomenon has resulted in a sub­
stantial transfer of income from the developed industrial 
nations to some underdeveloped primary goods exporting 
nations. Oil is by no means a single example of the rise 
in the price of primary goods.
The reason for higher prices can very easily be 
seen. Industrial countries are rapidly exhausting non­
renewable natural resources. Their industrial complex runs 
on energy which is quickly being depleted. Other inputs 
(raw materials) demanded by industrial nations are becoming 
unavailable either because supply is being exhausted or 
because of strong nationalistic sentiments in LDCs. They 
are making the supplies of these materials less available 
to developed countries. But whatever the cause, the reduc­
tion in supply and the existing demand in developed and 
underdeveloped will continue to push prices of primary goods 
up over time.
More specifically, CACM countries, because of low 
agricultural productivity and small industries, rely more 
on the foreign sector. Foreign exchange is therefore
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dependent on the sale of cotton, bananas, and coffee, not 
oil. To the extent that they must import oil, this is a 
drain on their foreign reserves. On the other hand, their 
exports are subject to the vagaries of world prices. The 
low demand and supply inelasticities for their products 
tend to contribute to instability in the region.
Since economic integration simultaneously results 
in gains and costs (losses), welfare is augmented if the 
gains exceed the costs. The determination of the net gain 
is not as clear cut as this account of the effects of eco­
nomic integration may lead one to expect. This is true 
because of the possibility that trade creation may lower 
welfare and trade diversion may increase welfare. "Lipsey 
establishes that the consumption effect can work either to 
raise or lower welfare and that trade diversion can raise 
welfare.
Thus, although we speak quite liberally of trade 
creation and trade diversion as imparting greater and lower 
welfare, respectively, in the countries involved, the di­
chotomy of gain (higher welfare) and loss (lower welfare) 
from integration is not quite so apparent.
The Effect of Integration on Panama
The previous theoretical analysis can be used to 
analyze the impact of integration in central America and 
Panama. As stated above, Panama is not currently a member
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of the CACM. The various partners have been trying to 
entice Panama into joining the union.
Lipsey states that the customs union will result in 
a worsening of the term of trade for the nonmember country. 
The conclusion is that the CACM will cause a deterioration 
in Panama's terms of trade and a decrease in welfare.
The data which will be used to analyze integration 
in Central America and Panama will be discussed in Chapter 
IV. The discussion will deal with the reliability and 
source of the data and hence, the limitations their use 
impose on the analyses done in the subsequent chapters of 
this study.
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CHAPTER IV 
DESCRIPTION OF DATA
Improving the quality of estimates used in a study 
like this is subject to the usual constraints facing the 
LDCs. For example# of particular significance are the 
problems confronting LDCs in estimating their national pro­
duct because of the monetized nature of their economies.
In this regard, estimating a large part of the gross output 
of goods and services is subject to a wide margin of error 
because in the absence of data, activities outside the 
monetary sphere have to be approximated. Further complica­
tions arise when exchange rates are used to express estimates 
of national product in a common currency unit. This approach 
is subject to a number of serious faults, both theoretical 
and statistical, which have been described elsewhere. The 
main criticism of this method is that it oversimplifies a 
complex problem of evaluating in a common currency unit the 
GNP of different currencies. One might argue that approxi­
mately accurate results can be achieved by this approach 
only where there exists an equivalence between the prevail­
ing rates of exchange and the relationship of internal
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forces. This equivalence is not likely to be experienced 
by most countries because of the prevalent use of exchange 
controls and quotas.
A second bias that data in LDCs promote is acces­
sibility. According to Mundell (Asian Drama, N.Y. 1968,
App 4.), "These are biases in the sense of both statistical 
skewness and unwarranted valuations." The quantitative 
data limitation forces restrictions of their own on the 
results and conclusion of the analysis conducted in this 
study. Data accessibility tends to reinforce the macro or 
aggregate bias, a stress on physical capital rather than 
human, and attention to few huge projects to the neglect of 
many small projects.
With these limitations on the data in mind the next 
step is to describe the sources, uses, and reliability or 
quality of the data used in this study.
The period of time covered in this study is 1950- 
1969, which is further broken down into two sub periods, 
i.e., 1950 to 1959, and 1960 to 1969. This breakdown fol­
lows logically from the nature of the subject of this study. 
The period 1950-1959 represents the pre-integration years 
and 1960-1969 the integration years.
The data series and the data sources for imports
and exports relevant to this study are dependent on the
United Nations Statistical data^ and on SIECA Statistical 
2
data. The figures are reported in some instances in U.S.
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dollars, Pesos Americanos, which are equivalent to U.S. 
dollars, and in the individual national currencies, which 
had to be converted to dollars. The total annual dollar 
figures were transformed to index numbers with a 1963 base. 
The data series are shown in Tables 2 and 8 in the appendix.
The data on exports from Panama to the CACM were 
not available for the period 1950 to 1959. Therefore, an 
alternative was sought for these data. The Panamanian 
exports to the CACk in 1960v 1961, 1962 and 1963 were 0.3%,
3
0.7%, 0.6% and 0.9%, respectively, of total Panamanian 
exports. Using a two-year moving average of these percen­
tages yields approximately 0.7%. The years 1960 to 1963 
were chosen because during these years the CACM was still 
not fully operational. Hence for the years 1950 to 1959, 
0.7% of the total exports (from the Year Book, 1968, p. 658) 
were assumed to go to the CACM from Panama. The series for 
this period were then divided by the value of exports to 
CACM in 1963 from Integration en Cifras to get the 1963 
export index.
Figures for gross national product (GNP) were of 
the quality and quantity of the University of California 
Statistical Abstract data.^ These data series were used 
for the informal analysis in this study. The GNP series 
appear in constant dollars of 1970 and were transformed to 
index numbers with a 1963 base. (See Table 1 in the appen­
dix. )
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Two price series were used in this study. They 
were extracted from various issues of the U.N. Year Book of 
International Trade Statistics and the IMF International 
Statistics, 1977 Supplement, Annual Data 1952-1976. The 
prices are in index form. In the IMF series, the prices 
appear with a 1970 base and were converted to a 1963 base.
The data are shown in Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix.
The computation of the relative price variables of 
the equations for the CACM demand was as follows.
GENR RELPR = ((PINDEX x duty)/(CPI) x B
GENR MPRICE = PINDEX x duty
where
GENR = generate
RELPR = import-price index/CACM price index 
B = 100
MPRICE = Import price index
CPI = CACM consumer price index
Duty = Tariff on CACM imports
PINDEX = Price index of imports of Panamanian goods.
The price variables should have been supply prices 
from both the CACM and Panama. Since they were not available, 
it was assumed that the CACM, CPI and import price index
would serve as adequate substitutes for the supply prices.
The price series includes the estimated tariff on imports.
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Approximate tariff rates were computed from the 
Year Book of International Trade Statistics, by finding the 
duty receipts on imports as a percentage of the total imports 
on an annual basis.^ (See Table 5 in the appendix.) The 
legal tariffs are weighted averages of industrial tariffs 
for 1958 and 1968.^ These are in two groups: one based on 
import value weights and the other on consumption. Data 
in Table 7 in the appendix show the trend in tariff protec­
tion in Central America. The legal tariffs were reduced to 
a uniform, intermediate level by 1968 from their 1958 levels. 
In addition, the consumption-weighted averages were higher 
than the import averages because of the high level of pro­
tection of basic consumption sectors for food and beverages 
and the lower levels of protection facing imports of raw 
materials and capital goods such as chemicals, steel and
7
iron, and metal and machinery products.
Imports flowing into the CACM were taken from the 
U.N. Year Book of International Trade Statistics, 1968.
These data series appear in various forms— U.S. dollars and 
national currencies,, which were transformed to U.S. dollars. 
Finally, the data were converted to index with a 1963 base. 
The import data used in this study were aggregate annual 
figures. Disaggregated annual values were available for 
SITC 1-9, but not for intra- or extra- area trade. Extra­
area imports were assumed to represent total CACM imports 
from 1950 to 1959.
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Data series for gross fixed capital formation are of 
the quantity and quality that appear in the IMF Financial 
Statistics, Annual Supplement, May 1977. This data series 
was used as a substitute for capital in the production func­
tion for the CACM. (See Table 11 in the appendix.)
The industrial wage index was taken from the Sta­
tistical Abstract of Latin America, Volume 18 (1977) . This 
series was compiled by John L. Martin, Labor’s Real Wages 
in Latin America Since 1940. Martin notes that "the indus­
trial worker is more highly organized that the worker in 
other sectors and can exert more leverage over society 
through strikes and demonstrations because of his importance 
in, and proximity to, the decision-making centers."
The dummy variable used in the aggregate production 
function is intended to capture the effects of integration 
on gross national income in the CACM area.
The total energy consumption variable (Table 6 in
the appendix) was assumed to place a constraint on CACM 
production. High import oil prices increase production 
costs and lower income and imports.
Data for Labor Displacement and Labor Displacement
Cost
The labor data for Panama are of the quality and 
quantity found in the ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics 
(various issues). The data series was used to determine
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the labor displacement and labor displacement cost generated 
in Panama by the CACM. The series covers a period from 
1960 to 1975 or 16 years. (See Table 13 in the appendix.)
The gross national product series for Panama from 
1960 to 1974 came from the International Financial Statis­
tics (1977) Supplement, Annual Data (1952-1976) ,  Volume XXX, 
No. 5, May 1977, pp. 302 and 303. The data series is in 
millions of Balboas, which are equivalent to dollars. The 
data are shown in Table 12 in the- appendix.
The gross fixed capital formation data series v/as 
taken from the International Financial Statistics (1977) 
Supplement, Annual Data (1952-1976), Volume XXX, No. 5,
May 1977, pp. 302 and 303. The data series covers a period 
of 16 years (i.e., 1960-1975) and is reported in millions 
of Balboas. See Table 14 in the appendix.
The data on industrial wages from 1960 to 1963 
came from the University of California, Statisitcal Abstract 
of Latin America, Volume 18, California, 1977.
In the next chapter we will measure the amount of 
trade creation and trade diversion in the CACM, and trade 
which is diverted from Panama by the Central American Com­
mon Market. Although references were made to the dynamic 
effects of integration, such measurements as structural 
transformation, investment effects and the effects of com­
petition within the CACM will, not be calculated despite the 
fact that they are relevant influences.
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The informal analyses of the gross national product 
and per capita gross national product of the CACM as well 
as of the rate of growth of both measurements will be dis­
cussed in Chapter V. The effects of trade balances and of 
balance of payments on each partner of the CACM will also 
be examined. The next chapter, in addition to discussing 
several ways of measuring the amount of trade diversion and 
trade creation, will also measure the distribution of such 
gains or losses.
FOOTNOTES
^United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics (1968), New York: United Nationsl Publishing
Service, 1970, pp. 12 and 13.
2
SIECA, Integracion en Cifras, Guatemala: Republic
of Guatemala, pp. 37 and 38.
3%bid.
^University of California, Statistical Abstract of 
Latin America, Volume 18, Los Angeles, Cal.: University
of California, 1977, pp. 300-303.
^United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics (1968), p. 7:
The ratio of import duties received to value of imports 
is not necessarily a reliable indicator of the magnitude 
of the effect of the level of import duties; very high 
duties discourage dutiable imports and thus may reduce 
rather than increase the ratio, furthermore, different 
countries apply duties to different classes of commo­
dities to diverse purposes, e.g., for revenue or for 
the protection of domestic industry.
The duty on traded goods varied from good to good. Duties 
were to be gradually lowered over a period of years, being 
completely eliminated in the year designated by agreement. 
The period may be as short as two years or as long as six. 
The rates on some goods were as high as 85% (on lard, for 
example) and as low as 8% (cosmetics) in the first year of 
the agreement. Convenios Centroamericanos de Integracion 
Economica I , SIECA.
^William R. Cline and Enrique Delgado, eds..
Economic Integration in Central America (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 80.
^Ibid., pp. 80 and 81.
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CHAPTER V
MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Introduction
Measurements of trade creation and trade diversion 
of the CACM will be dealt with in this chapter. In this 
chapter, the distribution of gains from integration and the 
viability of the CACM will also be discussed.
Two methods are used to measure the effects of inte­
gration, namely (1) informal and (2) static. A third pos­
sible method, dynamic analysis, is alluded to but no actual 
use of the method will be made. Regression analysis will 
be used to test for trade creation and trade diversion.
These analyses, to be useful, should be structured in a way 
that makes comparison before and after integration possible. 
The period 1950-1959 represents the pre-integration years^; 
the period 1960-1969 represents the period of "incubation 
and experimentation" and a period of time when the union was 
most fully operative. However, for the informal tests, 
the periods 1956-1962 and 1962-1968 will be used because 
they represent the most active years of planning and trade 
before and after integration, respectively. The informal
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analysis will begin in the next section with the data on 
GNP for the CACM and Panama.
Gross National Product of the CACM and Panama 
The first informal analysis to be discussed is GNP. 
The data in Tables 6 and 7 show the economic position, in 
absolute and in relative terms, of each of the CACM countries 
and Panama. In terms of GNP, Guatemala, followed by El Sal­
vador, appeared to be better off than the other members of 
the CACM. In terms of per capita GNP, Costa Rica would 
seem to be the most advanced country in the common market. 
Outside the common market, Panama registered a higher de­
gree of economic advancement, in relative terms, than any 
of the members of the CACM.
Each country shows increases in GNP and per capita 
GNP each year. These increases are not large, they appear 
to be approximately the same year after year. In general, 
both in an absolute sense and in a per capita sense, economic 
activities in the Central American republics are too re­
stricted to justify the massive use of capital in the region. 
Small markets restrict economic activities for even small 
industries with low capital requirements for their opera­
tions. The small markets as we have already indicated in­
hibit economic growth.
The next informal analysis is akin to the previous 
one. It pertains to rates of growth in total and per capita
TABLE 6
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN CONSTANT 1970 U.S. DOLLARS FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN
COUNTRIES, ANNUALLY, 1950-1974 
(In million of dollars)
YEAR GUATEMALA EL SALVADOR HONDURAS NICARAGUA COSTA RICA PANAMA
1950 761 403 275 264 276 285
1951 775 423 295 282 286 283
1952 791 454 313 323 322 299
1953 813 474 333 328 359 318
1954 828 484 336 362 378 324
1955 851 504 . 346 382 396 343
1956 931 524 359 389 405 361
1957 982 554 399 426 433 400
1958 1027 554 404 . 424 461 407
1959 1076 564 425 432 479 438
1960 1102 581 448 439 494 470
1961 1148 601 451 471 504 525
1962 1189 671 467 519 535 571
1963 1302 700 481 554 569 621
1964 1360 766 487 616 564 653
1965 1420 805 525 677 618 701
1966 1486 804 569 697 659 755
1967 1546 911 594 744 716 813
1968 1677 941 647 746 782 869
1969 1741 973 666 783 856 946
1970 1859 1008 701 818 902 1014
1971 1952 1048 729 859 938 1095
1972 2110 1109 757 900 1001 1166
1973 2268 1169 799 916 1073 1237
1974 2417 1230 820 1002 1118 1288
o
Source: Adapted from the Statistical Abstract of Latin ^erica. Vol. 18, edited by
James W. Wilke, co-editor Peter Reich (California: OCLA Latin American Center
Publication, 1977).
TABLE 7
PER CAPITA GNP IN CONSTANT 1970 DOLLARS, FOR CENTRAL AMERICA ANNUALLY 1950-1974
(In hundreds of dollars)
YEAR GUATEMALA EL SALVADOR HONDURAS NICARAGUA COSTA RICA PANAMA
1950 271 218 190 249 318 358
1951 268 220 199 258 318 345
1952 264 232 205 288 350 354
1953 263 232 212 284 376 366
1954 259 232 208 310 387 363
1955 260 , 235 208 312 387 373
1956 275 241 209 310 382 382
1957 281 244 226 330 392 412
1958 286 241 222 319 394 407
1959 290 237 226 315 394 425
1960 288 237 231 311 398 443
1961 291 237 225 324 388 479
1962 292 237 226 347 398 506
1963 311 256 225 359 409 534
1964 315 358 220 387 392 545
1965 320 273 230 413 415 568
1966 324 278 241 415 428 594
1967 328 288 243 432 450 620
1968 345 294 255 421 479 644
1969 350 294 254 430 508 681
1970 361 294 259 436 515 708
1971 372 294 261 445 520 743
1972 386 303 261 449 541 772
1973 408 309 267 445 561 793
1974 419 314 264 ' 480 572 793
Source: Adapted from the Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 18, edited by
0
0 1
James W. Wilke, co-editor Peter Reich (California: 
Publication, 1977).
UCLA Latin American Center
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GNP. These measurements of economic growth are useful 
because they reflect the rate of increase in GNP and in per 
capita GNP before integration, during integration, and 
after integration. If these rates are significantly diver­
gent from each other, during the different periods, the dif­
ference may be due to integration.
Data in Tables 8 and 9 show the rate of growth of 
total and per capita GNP. The rates of growth of GNP after 
integration can be clearly assessed from Tables 8 and 9.
It becomes apparent from the tables that the rates of 
growth of output for 1962-1968 were higher than the rates 
of growth for the periods 1956-1962 and 1968-1974; i.e., 
the pre- and post-integration years.
Data in Table 9 show gains in per capita GNP for 
all countries except Costa Rica. Panama, despite the fact 
that it is a nonmember, has experienced greater gains per 
capita than the CAC14 members. Furthermore, Panama's per­
formance could be a disincentive for her to join the union. 
It is noteworthy that Panama's GNP per capita declined 
during the period of integration of the five countries.
This decline may indicate that the formation of the Central 
American Common Market had a negative impact on the rate of 
per capita GNP (and GNP, see Table 8), and consequently on 
economic welfare in that country.
It must be underscored that gathering accurate 
data about the CACM is not an easy undertaking. One has to
TABLE 8
GNP GROWTH RATES, TOTAL IN CONSTANT DOLLARS, 1950-74
COUNTY TOTAL GNP
1956-1962 1962-1968 1968-1974
Nicaragua 4.8 6.2 4.9
Costa Rica 4.6 6.7 6.1
El Salvador 4.0 5.7 4.4
Honduras 4.3 5.5 3.8
o
Guatemala 4.0 5.9 6.3 -J
Panama j 8.3 7.5 6.9
Source: Adapted from the Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 18, edited by
James W. Wilke, co-editor Peter Reich (California: UCLA Latin American
Center Publication, 1977).
TABLE 9
RATE OF GROWTH OF PER CAPITA GNP (ANNUAL)
COUNTRY PER CAPITA GNP
1956-1962 1962-1968 1968-1974
Nicaragua 1.7 3.4 2.0
Costa Rica 0.6 2.9 2.8
El Salvador -0.2 3.4 1.0
Honduras 1.2 1.8 0.5
Guatemala 0.9 2.6 3.1
Panama 4.6 3.9 3.3
Source: Calculated from the Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 18, edited
by James W. Wilke, co-editor Peter Reich (California: UCLA Latin American
o
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Center Publication, 1977).
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rely on the data provided by the country without knowing 
how the counting procedure was conducted. In LDCs much 
of the domestic production of goods and services is done by 
households. Thus, GNP will underestimate output in these 
countries.
Obviously the more developed or industrial economies 
will report a higher GNP but this may be due in part to the 
fact that most of the goods and services in these economies 
go through the market place while in LDCs a substantial 
part of output is not monetized. This fact makes compari­
son between the countries difficult and misleading. On the 
other hand, per capita GNP, being an average, offers no 
information on the distribution of income in the various 
countries.
Since increases in both absolute and per capita GNP 
are evident, it cannot be ascertained if these increases 
can be attributed to integration. If per capita GNP in 
Panama is higher than in any other Central American economy, 
it could be argued that Panama need not join the CACM unless 
this movement will further add to her welfare.
Remember that the period 1956-1962 represents the 
pre-integration yeras. The 1962-1968 period may be called 
the period of "incubation and experimentation," and the 
years 1968-1974 a period of conflict and uncertainty. Dur­
ing the 1962-1968 period, significant gains were made by 
the five countries, with Costa Rica manifesting the highest
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rate of growth in GNP compared with the pre-integration 
period. The higher rates of growth of GNP in each country 
would suggest that integration accelerated growth. But it 
is difficult to isolate the effects of integration or growth 
from other factors which may also contribute'to growth. 
Panama's rate of growth accelerated during this integration 
period, too, but Panama was not a member of the CACM. To 
what, then, can be attributed the higher rate of growth in 
Panama?
The growth rates tell us nothing about whether the 
people are better off or not. If population rates of 
growth are higher than growth rates of GNP, then per capita 
GNP will decline, implying that welfare- per consumer has 
declined.
The analysis presented above seems to suggest that 
integration had a positive influence on income. This in­
ference discounts the effects of other variables on the 
rate of growth of output (income).
The effect of integration is to shift imports from 
the rest of the world to partners. This implies that 
domestic production must expand to fill the vacuum caused 
by tariff discrimination against nonpartners.
The five developing Central American republics are 
assumed to be capital poor. The supply of labor is not 
unlimited. These two factors in their infinite variety 
and coupled with the "state of the art" determine output.
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Output is shown in the following functional relationship 
X = f(K,L,t) (1)
where
X = income or output 
L = labor 
K = capital 
t = technology
The effect of integration on output has to be 
specifically incorporated into the analysis. This may be 
accomplished by means of inserting a variable into the 
production function which will capture the effect of inte­
gration. The variable is "switched on" for the integration 
period and "off" for the preintegration period. Hence, 
equation (1) may be rewritten as
X = f(L,K,t,D) (2)
where
D = dummy variable
Equation (1) and equation (2) are indistinguishable 
if D = 0. This will be true for the period 1950-1959.
When the period of analysis is 1960-1968, D takes on a value 
of one.
The supply of labor cannot be the same everywhere.
However, since the countries in the study produce the same
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agricultural export goods, it can be concluded that they 
are labor intensive producers, and that the labor force in 
each country is roughly the same, i.e., homogeneous.
The capital controversy centers around the question 
of whether the real world of heterogeneous capital goods 
would invalidate the theoretical production function.
The functional relationship between inputs and the 
resulting output described by equation (1) has the following 
properties.
1. Both capital and labor are necessary for the pro­
duction of X.
2. The production function is homogeneous of degree 
one.
3. And the marginal productivities of both factors 
are positive but decreasing.
For estimating purposes, equation (2) will be re­
written in linear form as
X^ = a^ + a-^ K + agL + u (3)
Xg = + a^K + a^L + a^D + u (4)
Equations (3) and (4) differ only by the a^D term 
by which changes in output from one period to another can 
be accounted for by the D in equation (4). The coefficient 
of D in equation (4) can be tested for statistical signifi­
cance. If it is statistically significant, it can be in­
ferred that integration raised CACM output.
113
The available data for the equation are the indus­
trial wage index and the gross fixed capital formation. The 
data are in real terms. The dependent variable is gross 
national product (see Table 6). The choice of the indus­
trial wage index for CACM was based on availabiliy. How­
ever, since the industrial sector is not as important as the 
nonindustrial sector in terms of relative contributions to 
income, the choice of industrial wages may underestimate 
the importance of labor in production. The coefficient for 
gross fixed capital formation may not be significant fol­
lowing this line of reasoning, since labor in developing 
countries contributes more to output than capital.
The concept of economic growth is defined simply as 
a rise in national income or output over time. The measure­
ment of this growth was done with a modified model to 
analyze the effects of integration on output. Thus, equa­
tion (1) becomes
X = f (K (i) ,L(w) ,D) + u (5)
where
L = L(w); L' < 0 
K = K(i) ; K' < 0 
i = real interest 
w = real wage 
D = dummy
u = disturbance term
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Equation (5) shows that output is a function of in­
terest and wages. An increase in wages above the equilibrium 
wage will result in a drop in employment and a reduction in 
output. The rate of gross capital formation is tied to the 
real rate of interest in the sense that lower real interest 
rates will increase the rate of gross capital formation by 
rendering such augmentations relatively cheaper. Differen­
tiating equation (5) yields the following expression.
+  —  +  —
For gross national product to rise, interest rates 
and wage rates must decline so that the first and second 
terms in equation (5) become positive. Alternatively, a 
drop in wages not offset by higher interest rates will 
raise income.
TABLE 10
AGGREGATE CACM PRODUCTION FUNCTION
Independent Regression
Variables . . . Coefficient t
Gross Fixed Capital Formation —0.008 -0.89
Industrial Wage Index -0.22 -3.68*
Dummy Variable 1.36 3.17*
Constant 5.54 12.50*
R^ = 0.66 D.W. = 1.83 N = 18
Dependent variable is GNP
♦Statistically significant at the 5% levels of significance, 
Source: Computed from equation (5).
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The results of the basic equation are shown in 
Table 10. R-squared indicates that 66% of the variations 
in the gross national income is explained by gross fixed 
capital formation and industrial wages and integration. 
According to the "t" values in the table, all of the inde­
pendent variables except GPCF are statistically significant 
at the 5% level of significance. At 5% D.W. test is in­
conclusive. Improved results were achieved by a log-linear 
regression shown in Table 11.
TABLE 11
AGGREGATE PRODUCTION FUNCTION (CACM)
Independent Regression
Variables Coefficient
Gross Fixed Capital Formation -0.02 -0.61
Industrial wage index -0.23 -4.14*
DUM 0.32 3.83*
Constant 1.77 15.77*
R^ = 0.70 D.W. = 2.04 
Dependent variable is. GNP
N = 18
Statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. 
Source: Computed from equation (5).
All coefficients of the independent variables 
except gross fixed capital formation are statistically sig­
nificant at the 5% level of significance. The estimated 
parameters are consistent with our suggested model for 
output. The signs of the coefficients are also consistent
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with the model. The coefficient of GFCF is -0.02 and it is 
statistically insignificant. Hence, it can be inferred 
that GFCF has very negligible effect if any on output. The 
Durbin-Watson test rejects the presence of serial correla­
tion in the disturbance term.
Of greater importance is the dummy variable which 
assumes a value of one in the equation to capture the effect 
of integration on output. The value of the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance, 
and this suggests that integration had a positive effect on 
output. This lends support to the conclusion tentatively 
reached by the informal analysis.
The aggregate data for the CACM production function 
presented in Tables 13 and 14 include a time trend variable. 
The "t" values corresponding to the independent variable 
are shown in Tables 13 and 14 in parentheses. At the 5% 
level of significance, the coefficient of the time trend 
variable is not significant. The inclusion of this time 
trend in equation (1) resulted in the coefficients of the 
other independent variables becoming statistically insig­
nificant at the 5% level of significance.
The effect is the same for both the regression 
results shown in Table 12 and the log linear regression 
results shown in Table 13. That is, all the coefficients 
of the independent variables are statistically insignificant 
at the 5% level of significance. In the final analysis.
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TABLE 12
AGGREGATE CACM PRODUCTION FUNCTION
Independent Regression
Variables Coefficient
Gross Fixed Capital Formation -0.19 -0.158
Industrial Wages Index -32.19 -0.729
Dummy Variable 31.69 0.065
Constant 3645.30 1.778
Time 228.53 1.503
R^ = 0.80 D.W. = 1.49 N = 18
The dependent variable is GNP
♦Statistical significance at the 5% level of significance.
Source: Computed from equation (5) modified by including
a time variable.
TABLE 13
AGGREGATE CACM PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
Independent Regression
Variables Coefficient t
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 0.014 0.28
Industrial Wage Index -0.578 -0.58
Dummy Variable 0.016 0.54
Constant 9.767 2.43^
Time 0.055 1.22
R^ = 0.84 D.W. = 1.45 
The dependent variable is GNP
N = 18
♦Statistical signifiance at the 5% level of signifiance.
Source: Computed from equation (5) modified by including
a time variable.
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the inclusion of time trend in equation (1) may have no 
predictive or statistical value and should be dropped from 
the equation. It is uncertain whether time plays any sig­
nificant part in determining CACM output, since multicol- 
linearity may have produced the low "t" values shown in 
Tables 12 and 13.
Analysis of Trade Balances and Balance of Payments
Another informal analysis of economic gain centers 
on trade balances. This measurement, however, more appro­
priately refers to the distribution of the gains from inte­
gration among the partners. The countries with more favor­
able trade balances are assumed to have benefited from 
integration relative to other members.
Data on trade balances shown in Table 14 indicate 
that all countries had trade deficits during many years. 
Guatemala and El Salvador were the main beneficiaries of 
integration. After Costa Rica joined the union officially 
in 1962 her balance of trade record displayed a remarkable 
improvement in 1964, but depreciated steadily afterwards, 
becoming negative in 1967 and 1968. The data in Table 15 
show that after 1962, El Salvador, GuatemaLla, and Honduras 
experienced a worsening in their balance of payments. 
Nicaragua experienced a worsening in the balance of payment 
from 1962 to 1965, but showed a steady improvement there­
after until 1968, when she had a deficit of $5 million.
TABLE 14
TRADE BALANCES: INTRA CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE 1960-1969
(IN THOUSANDS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN PESO)
Countries 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Guatemala -2625 -302 2205 -2454 3201 4035 16990 15842 27640 32301
El Salvador -1199 369 -3363 2306 -2439 2988 6575 24647 19757 14615
Honduras 2766 2268 3170 -793 -1563 -4956 -14535 -17357 -18323 -21843
Nicaragua -249 -1074 -1812 -2594 -7183 -8995 -15483 -24129 -21536 -10535
Costa Rica -1093 -1849 -1588 128 7105 3541 2002 -7311 -12620 -13471
CACM -2400 -588 -1388 -3407 -879 -3390 -4451 -8308 -5082 1062
SOURCE: Integracion en Cifras, SIECA, July 1979
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TABLE 15
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS, 1962-1968 
(MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
Countries 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Costa Rica -4.3 3.8 9.2 10.6 6.1 -27.3 -9.1
El Salvador 35.1 -5.1 -40.7 -31.2 -77.5 -41.5 -10.7
Guatemala 14.5 -10.7 -5.3 -4.1 14.7 3.2 -2.3
Honduras 0.1 0.9 -6.7 -6.8 -.3 13.8 -22.4
Nicaragua
1
-4.1 —6.8 -5.1 -0.7 13.0 18.9 -5.2
Panama 0.7 -5.8 22.0 4.9 6.6 12.3 1.3
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Year Book, Vol. 21,
to
o
1964-1968, Washington, B.C.
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Panama developed an unfavorable balance of payments only
in 1962. The data in Table 15 seem to suggest that the main
beneficiary of economic integration was Costa Rica. The • •
countries "hurt" by integration would require appropriate
compensations. The desirability of compensation suggests
that, in practice, new intraregional trade flows ought to
be balanced, or at least not worsened, as a result of the
formation of the Common Market.^ What is relevant is that
no absolute method of directing trade flows appears likely.
With integration, specialization will lead to new patterns
of trade and payments. So in the final analysis, what is
relevant is the total balance of payments position when the
effects of integration on trade are being evaluated.^
The outcome, of course, is not that simple.
Because of the formation of the union, one can 
imagine two possible outcomes in the pattern of spe­
cialization. First, as is implicitly assumed in both 
the theoretical and empirical literature on customs 
union, is the case where there is no change in com­
parative advantage and thus no shift in specialization 
pattern is indicated. Second, is the situation where 
country A may now, because of the differential tariffs 
between A and B on goods from C, (so that A exports 
the good it formerly imported) . . . this would be 
a reversal of its previous specialization pattern.5
Implications of the Balance of Payments Analysis
If a country has a central banking system, a growing 
balance of payments deficit will cause an increasing outflow 
of foreign exchange which has two effects: (1) a drop in
the country's foreign exchange; (2) a reduction in the
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country's money supply. A drop in the money supply will 
contract aggregate demand and money income and employment. 
Monetary policy by the monetary authorities would call for 
an expansion in the money supply by the purchasing of bonds 
on the open market, the lowering of the discount rate, and 
the lowering of the reserve requirements. Expansionary 
monetary policy would prevent the contraction caused by 
the liquidity shortage occasioned by the balance-of-payments 
deficit.^
No matter how large the initial reserves, a country 
cannot maintain a balance-of-payments deficit indefinitely 
because the outflows will eliminate the reserves and cause 
a reduction in economic growth, unless some means can be 
found to expand exports and/or promote import substitution. 
Devaluation of the domestic currency is an alternative 
solution.
The balance-of-payments problems of the CACM coun­
tries had to be dealt with. The Central American Clearing 
House was instrumental in the increase in intraregional 
trade by clearing payments within the Central American re­
gion, and by making Credit available to the members.
A San Jose Protocol added a 30 percent surcharge on 
all import duties from nonmembers; a voluntary consumption 
tax of 10 percent on all nonessential items; and 20 percent 
on luxury commodities. Another device to ease the balance 
of payments problem was incorporated in the protocol. For 
example.
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In February 1970 the Fondo Centroamericao de Establiza- 
cion Monetaria began operations to ease short-run 
balance-of-payments problems. The Stabilization Fund 
received $4 million from each member, $5 million from 
Venezuela, and $10 million for USAID.7
The result was that all the countries experienced 
improvements in their balance-of-payments except Honduras.
As a result of this worsening position, Honduras reimposed 
its internal tariffs, according to the strength of Decree 97, 
on all the Central American countries to which the other
p
members responded by placing tariffs on all Honduran goods.
Because of the loss of trade suffered by El Salvador 
after its conflict with Honduras, El Salvador tried to get 
preferential trade agreement with Panama to replace its 
losses. "Panama has generally had preferential tariff rates 
or exemptions from control on goods traded with both Nica-
9
ragua and Costa Rica."
Countries get paranoid when they suffer from balance- 
of-payments or trade deficits. But attempts by any one 
country to achieve a balance of payments surplus can have 
adverse effects on the other countries. Regulations to 
insure a surplus position may undermine the importance of 
integration and its benefits. It might be argued too that 
if there is a net gain from integration, it is justified.
This is not a Pareto optimal solution because the net gain 
may imply that some countries are worse off. Obviously the 
countries that are worse off will have an incentive to 
withdraw from the union. The basis for integration rests
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on benefits (not losses) and not on altruism or ulterior 
motives such as the overall good.
Rather than oppose balance-of-trade inequities, the
countries should recognize that
These inequities may be offset by the accelerated 
growth resulting from regional investment policies.
The key to the CACM's success is the pattern of in­
dustrialization resulting from the integration indus­
tries programs, . . . Free internal trade and 
appropriate external tariffs are provided to these 
industries. If balanced trade flows are enforced the 
larger potential benefits from regional industrial 
growth may be lost.10
In the 1960's, Panama had a favorable balance of 
payments, but the record of performance for the 1970s was 
not quite as good. Because Panama lacks a Central bank, 
it has to depend on international banks to finance its 
balance-of-payments deficit. A high deficit that cannot be 
financed can be translated to an offer for a loan for less 
than the desired amount of the deficit. The result is, on 
the other hand, higher real production costs for the economy, 
and on the other hand, a contraction caused by the expenses 
of servicing the loans and the effects on the level of 
production, income and employment. This was the case for 
Pan.ama in 1975, during which time the country experienced 
the greatest debt to the internatinal financial markets.
Conclusion
The above analysis has provided useful information 
about the progress of economic integration in the CACM.
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The GNP and per capita GNP figures have shown gains during 
the period of integration relative to the pre-integration 
period.
The review of the rates of growth of GNP and per 
capita GNP suggests improvements in wellbeing accompanying 
integration.
The analysis of trade balances and balance of pay­
ments gives some indication of the major gains from integra­
tion. The country with favorable balances or small unfav­
orable ones relative to the other countries may be the 
ones which experience greater gains from integration.
The above economic indicators do not disaggregate 
the effects of the various factors which promote economic 
growth. Hence, to achieve more accurate and meaningful 
information about the effects on integration on economic 
development, a more complete model is needed. Three such 
models for the analysis of trade creation and trade di­
version are developed below.
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CHAPTER VI 
TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION 
Introduction
A tariff will have the dual effect of raising the 
domestic price of the imported good and of promoting the 
inefficient use of the country's scarce resources. There­
fore, the removal of duties among common market members will 
have these two effects as well.
Theoretically, the welfare effects of the removal 
of trade barriers between partners can be seen from partial 
equilibrium in the graphical representation that follows 
(Figure 2).
Both the world price OW and the customs union price 
OP^ are assumed to be infinitely elastic. Before the cus­
toms union is formed, nothing is imported from prospective 
partners; however, after it is formed, nothing is imported 
from the rest of the world.
The customs union has the effect of expanding trade 
from MgMg to this is trade creation. It also has the
effect of diverting from the rest of the world (a low
cost supplier) to the partner or high-cost supplier. This 
is the trade diversion effect.
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FIGURE 2
DEMAND AND SUPPLY FOR THE IMPORTED GOOD M
m
W(1 + t)
Pc
w
M0 M. M M_ M
where;
DD = home country's demand curve
SS = home country's supply curve
MgMg = import of M at price OW (1 + t)
0W(1 + t) = tariff inclusive world price 
OW = world price
OP^ = customs union price = OW (1 + t'), wher^t' < t
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The welfare gains or deadweight gains are the tri­
angles a and b in Figure 2 ,  and are, respectively, the 
production and consumption effects of integration. The 
result is that the price falls from 0W(1 + t) to OP^ and 
production of the importable good is reduced, on the one 
hand, and consumption of the good is increased, on the 
other hand. In this comparative static analysis of the 
effects of trade liberalization, recognition is given to the 
drop in domestic production which implies that there is 
displaced employment.
The model of the customs union used in this study 
consists of three countries A, B, and C. Country A is the 
home country; B the partner, and C the rest of the world.
The formation of a partnership with A and B has the effect 
of reducing A's production of the importable good and of 
reducing employment in that sector. But since A shifts 
demand for the importables from C to B, B has to raise pro­
duction and thus employment to satisfy A's demand. So 
the drop in employment in A may be offset by a rise in 
employment in B. Country C, however, will experience some 
reduction in output from being excluded from the market.
This exclusion will result in displacement of labor. Since 
Panama is country C in this study, it will be expedient to 
estimate the labor displacement cost to Panama.
The rectangle c in Figure 2 represents the welfare 
or deadweight loss because MgMg after integrationmust be 
secured at a higher cost.
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In this one-commodity case, trade creation and the 
gains from the customs union are evidently greater, the 
greater the elasticities of demand and supply in the 
home country (or the flatter the demand and supply 
curves in Figure 2), the wider the cost differences 
between home country and partner> and the smaller these 
differences between partners and the world. On the 
other hand, the trade diversion loss is greater, the 
less elastic the demand and supply curves in the home 
country, and smaller the cost differences between home 
and the partner, and the wider they are between part­
ner and the world.1
Certainly, since the social utility of the region
is a function of the tariff and the terms of trade, the
reduction in tariff will lead to an improvement in welfare.
The extent of the improvement in welfare will depend on
the relative elasticities of demand and supply for the
importable good. The larger the elasticities of supply and
demand are, the larger the gains from integration, and the
move will translate into larger improvements in utility.
Income Propensity to Import 
The above results can be depicted algebraically as 
follows: Trade creation and consumption effect TC and
trade diversion TD are
TC = (N^ - Nq) c ^ (trade creation) (1)
TD = (Nq - N^) C^ (trade diversion) (2)
where
N = average propensity to import M/GNP 
C = apparent consumption of goods measured as
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domestic production plus total imports minus 
total exports of the good
t = superscript referring to total importation
0 = base year
1 = terminal year
r = the rest of the world imports
From Figure 2 (see page 128) it can be seen that 
total imports increased after integration by the amount
M 1 M 4  -  M 2 M 3 .
We assumed that the propensity to import remains 
unchanged if there is no integration. So equation 1 shows 
the increase in total imports above the expected increase 
if the propensity to import had remained the same after 
integration. If the propensity to import is different 
after integration, the difference is attributed to integra­
tion. If the propensity to import is different after in­
tegration, the difference is attributed to integration. 
Equation 2, on the other hand, shows the decrease in total 
imports from the rest of the world above the expected in­
crease if the propensity to import had remained the same.
Equations 1 and 2 measure changes in the volume of 
trade due to integration. It is useful to translate these 
changes to welfare costs and benefits. This can be accom­
plished by considering the world price W and the partner 
price P- for the importable good.
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Welfare Cost of TD and Welfare Gain from TC 
The rectangle c in Figure 2 shows the welfare cost 
of integration.
c = (P^ - W) = trade diversion cost (3)
TD = W X MgMg = trade diversion (4)
so
c = (Pyw - W/W) W X MgM] (3a)
The welfare gains are depicted in Figure 2 by the 
triangles a and b. Thus, we can derive the equation for 
welfare gain as follows;
G = a + b = 1/2 (W*(1 + t) - P^) • (M^M^ - MgMg)
The analysis may be expanded to include the present 
value of a future stream of gains from integration. To 
accomplish this it is necessary to compute the rate of im­
ports over the integration period. This rate is then used 
to estimate future import gains. The gains are then dis­
counted to the present at some rate of return (interest) 
such as Treasury Bills in the U.S. Such an analysis is not 
germane to this study and will not be pursued.
As with the informal analyses, this test for trade 
creation and trade diversion does not incorporate changes 
due to prices or changes in tariff. This test attributes
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changes in average propensity to import to integration with 
all other variables being held constant. Supply and demand 
might change as the variables that are terms in these func­
tions change.
Because supply and demand conditions will likely 
vary from industry to industry, it is necessary to disaggre­
gate the data as much as possible. The disaggregation, 
however, poses another problem, since it assumes GNP is a 
correct or appropriate proxy for each demand group consid­
ered. The income variable, GNP, suggests that the pattern 
of demand will remain unchanged.
By abstracting from the influence of changes in the 
rate of growth of GNP on trade this method purports 
to indicate the static effects of integration, i.e., 
the impact of the elimination of internal duties on 
trade under ceteris paribus assumptions.
The complete effect of integration on trade flow is 
not revealed by this test. Since the output after integra­
tion may be greater than before, the test would understate 
the increase in union trade and overstate the decrease in 
nonunion trade. This is true because integration will in­
volve dynamic effects such as changes in competition, in­
vestment, and structural transformation from agriculture 
to industry. "The influence of non-recurring factors, 
structural changes and uncertainties relating to the under- 
lying relationships also give rise to errors."
The advantage of the test for welfare costs and 
benefits of integration is that it takes into account price
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and tariff changes, which enter into the analysis of the 
customs union or the common market. With the above 
limitations of the income analysis taken into considera­
tion, we now turn our attention to the analysis of the 
results.
The data in Tables 16 and 17 show that all five 
countries had positive welfare benefits from integration 
in 1968. The apparent anomaly in welfare gains for Hon­
duras in both absolute and relative terms may be explained 
as a result of the limitation of the measurement used.to 
determine gains and losses. When other static and dynamic 
effects are considered, both absolute and relative gains 
diminish for Honduras and increase for the more advanced 
countries.^ With this in mind, the ranking of countries 
from most favored to least favored, i.e., Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Honduras, is violated.
Although all the CACM countries benefitted from 
integration, the distribution of the benefits in 1968 was 
very unequal, being nine times as much for Costa Rica as 
for El Salvador, or 14 times in terms of net benefit per 
capita.
Obviously, this partial analysis does not properly 
convey the ranking of the countries or their "true" share 
of benefits. It could not be used to lend support to the 
Honduran complaint (that more advanced countries benefit)
TABLE 16
INTEGRATION EFFECTS, 1968 
(Millions of U.S. $)
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua CACM
Basic Effects
Trade Creation 39.20 15.27 39.56 81.08 61.46 236.57
Trade Diversion 4.08 28.03 -8.03 —40.06 -21.32 -37.30
Welfare Effects
Trade Creation 15.44 2.00 10.39 18.31 11.14 57.28
Trade Diversion -0.58 -0.27 -0.08 3.08 0.82 2.97
Net Benefit 16.02 2.27 10.47 15.23 10.32 54.31
Source: Computed from Integracion eni Cifras , SIECA, July 1979.
H*
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more from integration) and her eventual withdrawal from the 
CACM.
The data in Table 16 show that after integration 
all CACM countries experienced an increased volume of im­
ports. The results for trade with the rest of the world 
were not quite as conclusive. Both Costa Rica and El Sal­
vador reduced their extra-area imports, but Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua increased theirs. The positive 
values in Table 16 indicate trade creation. A positive 
sign for trade diversion suggests external trade augmenta­
tion, because trade with the rest of the world in the 
terminal year (1968) was greater than in the base year 
(1960). Thus Costa Rica and El Salvador increased their 
imports from the rest of the world. The net welfare effect 
was positive for all the countries. Hence each country 
experienced an improvement in welfare after the economic 
integration of Central America.
Imports were conputed for Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC) groups 1 through 8 for each 
country. GNP is the proxy used for the income variable. 
Imports from the rest of the world showed an upward trend 
for each commodity group. Imports of the SITC groups 5,
6 and 8, and 7, representing chemical, manufactured goods 
and machinery, and transport equipment, respectively, in­
creased about twofold from 1960 to 1968. Some of the
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increase reflected in Table 16 is in the form of "negative" 
trade diversion for Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala. This 
is not difficult to understand. Machinery and manufactured 
goods will flow to the union from the developed countries 
until the union develops or acquires the technology to pro­
duce these goods to satisfy the area's internal demand.
Distribution of Integration Benefits 
The net welfare benefits from integration shown in 
Table 16 are based exclusively on the effects of cooperation 
and protection, i.e., the static effects of integration. 
Other static effects such as trade suppression, external 
trade augmentation,-the opportunity cost of labor, econo­
mies of scale, and foreign exchange savings, plus such 
dynamic effects as structural transformation of the economy, 
the investment effects, and the competitive effects which 
produce gains (losses), too, were dealt with quite exten­
sively by the Brookings Institution study of the CACM. It 
would be superfluous to repeat the exercise here.
In addition, no distinction was made for different 
classification of commodities. Also, the results obtained 
in Table 16 do not fully represent the total gains and 
losses from economic integration in Central America, because 
some goods are traded more than others. A classification 
of goods analysis would reveal which ones are traded more.
Nevertheless, the question of distribution arises.
An elaborate distributional scheme would necessitate
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isolating many combinations of gains from integration.
It would have to be determined how well the country could 
perform alone, in conjunction with one other country, two 
other countries, three other countries and four other 
countries. In this manner it could be determined which 
combination best suits the country. For example, if A is 
the country under consideration,
assume v(A) = characteristic function of all of 
A ’s benefits 
= the benefits given to A,
then for two countries, the following condition must be 
present for a country A to join a union,
= v(A) (5)
Xa  + Xg = v(A,B) (6)
or V(A) = X^ = v(A,B,C) - v(B,C) (7)
In condition (5), the benefits received must be 
equal to or greater than what the country could do alone. 
Condition (6) means mutual acceptability exists if the sum 
of the benefits received by countries A and B must be 
equal to or greater than what they could receive with co­
operation with country c. The last condition is an expres­
sion of conditions one and two. Clearly, country A will 
participate in the integration effort if the gains received
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by are equal to or greater than the gains from indepen­
dence. The benefit accruing to A is the difference between 
the sum of the benefits of the three countries, v(A,B,C) and 
the sum of the benefits from cooperation of two countries 
v(B,C). Once again I must eschew the thorough analysis for 
a more simplified version.^
The distribution of gains from integration is shown 
in Table 17. The largest gainers appear to be Honduras and 
Costa Rica, receiving 28% and 29.5% of the total benefits, 
respectively. With regard to the distribution in terms of 
the population, Costa Rica and Honduras are once again the 
countries gaining most from integration. A look at percen­
tage of benefits as a percentage of GNP shows Costa Rica 
and Honduras as the two largest gainers from integration.
The order of ranking according to the distribution 
of benefits differs from the results obtained by the Brook­
ings Institution. One reason for this difference is the 
inclusion of other effects by the Brookings study such as 
trade suppression, economies of scale and so on.
One final point is that the results shown in 
Table 17 represent the possible or potential distribution 
of the benefits on losses from integration, not the actual 
distribution.
The next section will deal with a variant of the 
income elasticities method discussed in this section. The 
Ex Post Income Elasticities will test from the presence of 
trade creation and trade diversion.
TABLE 17
DISTRIBUTION OF GAINS FROM INTEGRATION, 1968
Benefits Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua CACM
1. % share of 
Benefits 29.5 4.2 19.3 28.0 19.0 100
2. % share of
Population 11.8 23.8 34.2 17.5 12.6 100
GNP 16.3 19.6 35.0 13.5 15.6 100
3. Ratio, % Net 
Benefit to
%Population 2.5 0.18 0.56 1.6 1.51 1.00
%GNP 1.81 0.21 0.55 2.07 1.22 1.00
o
Format from Brookings CACM study, 1978
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Ex Post Income Elasticities
This section deals with an alternative way of 
looking at the income propensity to import method of measure­
ment. It is assumed as before that the income elasticities 
of import demand would have remained unchanged in the ab­
sence of economic integration.
The ex post income elasticity of demand for imports 
is used to calculate trade creation and trade diversion by 
comparing the ratios of the average annual rate of change 
of imports to that of GNP at two different points in time. 
Hence, a rise in the income elasticity of demand for union 
imports suggests gross trade creation, but an increase in 
the income elasticity of demand for imports from all sources 
of supply means trade creation proper has occurred. On 
the other hand, a fall in the income elasticity of demand 
for non-union imports indicates trade diversion.
The procedure followed in the analysis of trade 
creation and trade diversion is developed and outlined 
below.
TC = i^/G^ < I2 /G2 ; in union (common market) trade
(8)
TD = I^/G^ > I2 /G2 ' in nonunion (rest of the world)
trade (9)
where
TC = trade creation
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TD = trade diversion
= average annual rate of change of imports before 
integration
ig = average annual rate of change of imports after 
integration
= average annual rate of change of GNP before 
integration
Gg = average annual rate of change of GNP after 
integration.
When applied to union trade flows, the measure 
describes gross trade creation; obviously, when the CACM 
imports from the rest of the world, it describes trade cre­
ation proper.
The second test, i^/G^ > I2 /G2 , can be applied to 
one country such as Panama, rather than all nonmembers. A 
positive test would indicate trade diversion with respect 
to Panama alone.
The test ascribes changes in the ratios to the
effect of integration with all other variables such as
prices, tariffs, supply availability, taste, etc., held
constant. Evidently, these variables are subject to change.
It is desirable to disaggreagte the data as much as 
possible since supply and demand conditions may vary 
considerably from industry to industry. Disaggre­
gation has the limitation, however, of assuming that 
GNP is the appropriate demand proxy each product group 
considered. The use of GNP as the income variable im­
plies that the commodity pattern of demand remains 
unchanged over time.®
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In addition, unlike the previous method, which is a test 
for the value of trade creation or diversion, this method 
tests for the presence of trade creation or diversion.
In Table 18 the negative signs suggest the presence 
of trade diversion and the positive ones the presence of 
trade creation. In the total imports segment of Table 18, 
for all the commodity groups except SITC 1 and 2, trade 
diversion was present. For food, SITC 0, the import elas­
ticities have not changed much, hence, it may be concluded 
that for food there had been no significant integration 
effect. Trade diversion in the other commodity classifi­
cation was partly indicative of the fact that LDCs aspiring 
to development would enhance that possibility by importing 
needed physical capital. For.nonmarket economies, trade 
diversion in several commodity groups was offset by increases 
in imports of fuel and machinery.
Based on the data in Table 18, intra-area trade 
shows the expected evidence of trade creation and extra­
area trade shows evidence of trade diversion in all cate­
gories but SITC 1 and 2. This means that imports among the 
members of the CACM increased. Imports from the rest of 
the world in two groups of goods increased as well. The 
average legal tariff in 1968 was 28%, which is not really 
prohibitive, and could, in part, account for the increase 
in extra-area trade in beverages, and tobacco and crude 
materials, the tariff was lower than the tariff levels for 
previous years (see Table 7 in Appendix).
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TABLE 18
INCOME ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND IN CACM
Category
Annual Rate 
Of Growth
1954- 1960-
1960 1968
(1) (2)
Income Elasticity**____
1954- 1960-
1960 1968 Difference
(3) (4) (5) = (4)-(3)
TOTAL IMPORT
0 Food and live animals 7.3 13.6 1.8 1.6 -0.2
1 Beverages and tobacco -1.3 6.0 -0.3 0.7 1.0
2 Crude materials, inedible.
except fuel 1.2 39.9 0.3 4.9 4.6
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants 10.5 3.5 2.6 0.4 -2.2
4 Animal and vegetable oils and
fats 32.4 25.4 8.1 3.1 -5.0
5 Chemicals 10.5 19.9 2.6 2.4 -0.2
6 Manufactured goods 9.1 14.8 2.3 1.8 -0.5
7 Machinery and transport equip. 11.2 14.1 2.8 1.7 -1.1
8 Misc. manufactured articles 11.4 16.5 2.9 2.0 -0.9
0 to 8, Total of above 9.7 14.8 2.4 1.8 -0.6
INTRA-AREA IMPORTS*
0 Food and live animals 9.9 87.9 2.5 10.8 8.3
1 Beverages and tobacco 4.8 46.4 0.0 5.7 -5.7
2 Crude materials, inedible,
except fuel 0.0 22.3 -1.2 27.5 28.7
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants 11.2 58.8 0.8 7.3 6.5
4 Animal and vegetable oils and
fats 14.2 221.4 10.7 27.3 16.6
5 Chemicals 11.7 116.2 2.8 14.3 11.5
6 Manufactured goods 9.7 98.4 2.4 -12.1 14.5
7 Machinery and transport equip. 12.6 90.0 3.2 11.1 7.9
8 Misc. manufactured articles 14.3 95.7 3.6 11.8 8.3
0 to 8, Total of edsove 10.6 98.6 2.7 12.2 9.5
EXTRA-AREA IMPORTS*
0 Food and live animals 7.2 8.2 1.8 1.0 -0.8
1 Beverages and tobacoo -1.6 2.4 -0.4 0.3 0.7
2 Crude materials, inedible,
except fuel 1.2 29.1 0.3 3.4 3.1
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants 10.5 -0.002 2.6 -0.0002 -2.6
4 Animal and vegetable oils and
fats 33.8 17.0 8.5 2.1 -6.4
5 Chemicals 10.5 13.4 2.6 1.7 -0.9
6 Manufactured goods 9.1 9.4 2.3 1.2 -1.1
7 Machinery and transport equip. 11.1 8.9 2.8 1.1 -1.7
3 Misc. manufactured articles 11.2 10.7 2.8 1.3 -1.5
0 to 3, Total of Above 9.6 T.-2 2.4 0.9 -1.5
Gross National Product 4.0 8.1
*Intra-inter area trade estimated at 6* and 944, respectively, for each
SITC group total.
**Computed by taking columns 1 and 2 divided by 4.0 and 8.1, respectively.
Source: Computed from the Year Book of International Trade Statistics,
various issues.
TABLE 19
PANAMA'S IMPORTS INTO THE CACM, 1960 and 1968 
(In millions of U.S. $)
1960^ Hypothetical^ 
imports in 1968
Actual
ports.
im-
1968
differences between actual 
Imports, 1968
& hypothetical
(In
(1)
1952^-60 60-68
1960 prices) 
(2) (3)
in
1960
prices
(4)
in
1968
prices
(5)
Common Market 
(3) - (2)
(6)
Competitive 
Effect 
(4) - (3) 
(7)
Price Effect 
(5) - (4)
(8)
Together 
(5) - (2)
(9)
Panama 1.063 1.976 1.913 6.570 6.570 -0.063 4.657 0.0 4.594
Represents actual imports for 1960
^Calculated at growth rates of extra-area imports for the period 
Represents 1952 total imports
Source: Format from Balassa, "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common
Market," The Economic Journal (March 1967), p. 12.
146
In Table 19 the hypothetical import is assumed to 
be that level of import that would have resulted in the 
absence of a discriminatory tariff. The difference between 
actual and hypothetical imports was $4.5 million import from 
Panama after integration. The competitive effect of Panaman­
ian goods was mainly responsible for this result. The 
common market effect was the difference between what imports 
would have been in 1960, by applying actual rates of growth 
between 1952 and 1960 to total imports from Panama in 1960, 
and actual rate of growth between 1960 and 1968 to total 
imports in 1960. The formation of the CACM resulted in a 
$0,063 million loss to Panama.
The competitive effect was the difference between 
imports in constant prices and hypothetical imports computed 
by applying growth rates in the integration period to 1960 
imports. The data in Table 19 show a positive competitive 
effect of $4,657 million.
The price effect was simply the difference between 
imports expressed in current and in constant prices. In 
this regard Panama had not experienced any change.
Panama appeared not to have benefitted from the 
common market effect despite the bilateral trade agreements 
with Costa Rica arid Nicaragua in 1965. The foramtion of 
the CACM resulted in a loss of trade to Panama of $0.06 
million, but an increase in the overall share of common 
market imports of $6 million. This improvement in competi-
147
tive performance is shown in column 7 of Table 19. The 
improvement in market share substantially offsets the trade 
diversion from the formation of the common market, so that 
the net effect of the formation of the union on Panama was 
positive.
The positive competitive effect shown may have been 
due partly to the bilateral agreements alluded to before.
The overall benefit to Panama may have been attributed to 
the increase in trade due to the agreements made possible 
between the CACM and Panama. The virtue of the ex post 
income elasticities method is the breakdown of the effects 
of integration by several categories. A modification of 
this approach is considered next.
The preceding analysis is analogous to one developed
7
by Lamfalussy. The tenor of the Lamfalussy approach is 
to breakdown the effect of a country's exports into three 
components. These are defined and explained in the discus­
sion which follows.
The gains (or losses) to Panama using Lamfalussy's 
method is as follows:
Tp= X2 - rX^ ■ (10)
where
r = percent change in CACM exports from 1960-1968 
to the CACM— this is the intraregional trade 
rise from integration
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= Panama's exports in 1960 to the CACM
= Panama's exports in 1968 to the CACM
If Tp is negative, Panama has suffered losses in trade due 
to integration and a discriminatory tariff. A positive Tp 
means gains from trade.
A second equation is used to determine the effect 
of the composition of commodity on trade.
Cp = Z - rX^ (11)
where
= percent change in CACM exports of good i from 
1960-1968
X^ = Panama's exports of good i in 1960.
The type of Panamanian goods that are exported to 
the CACM will determine the effect of integration on exports. 
If Cp is negative, there are losses to Panama due to the 
composition of the commodities Panama exports to the CACM. 
Zero means no effect. A positive value means benefits ac­
crue to Panama from the commodity composition.
The market distribution effect is measured by
Mp = 2 r^jX^j - 2 r^X^ (12)
where
r^j = percent change in CACM exports of good i to 
CACM country j, from 1960-1968
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= Panama's exports of each good i to each CACM 
market country j, in 1960.
If Mp is negative, there will be a loss to Panama 
due to market distribution of Panama's goods in the CACM. 
The fourth effect considered is the competitive
effect:
P = X - S r.jX^. (13)
where
X. and r..X.. are defined as above.
J 1 3  1 J
A positive competitive effect means that Panamanian 
goods gained competitiveness in the CACM relative to part­
ners because of tariff discrimination.
From Integracion en Gifras, the values of Panama's 
exports to CACM in 1960 and 1968 were $59,000 and $2,786,000, 
respectively. The years 1960 and 1968 were chosen because 
the data series begins in 1960 and complete integration was 
not achieved until 1962; so 1960 was a pre-integration year; 
1968 was the year prior to the withdrawal of Honduras.
Using equation 10, we get
T = Xgg - rXgQ = 2,786 - (8.15) (59) = $2,305,150.
This result is inconsistent with theory (i.e.,
Panama should show a drop in the value of trade). But part 
of the cause of the inconsistency may be explained by the
1.50
bilateral agreements between Panama and members of the CACM. 
From equation 5 the dummy variable used to capture the 
effects of the bilateral agreements is significant at the 
5% level. This suggests that these agreements must be taken 
into account.
Remembering that the first bilateral agreement was 
signed in 1965, a more accurate analysis of the effect of 
the union on Panama may be obtained by taking 1960 and 1964 
as base and terminal years, respectively.
T = - rXgQ = (8.15) (59) = $372,150
The result here is also positive. An additional 
explanation may be the import trend, that is, each year the 
CACM imported more and more of Panama's goods. Thus, the 
rate of growth of intra-union trade was lower than the rate 
of growth of Panamanian exports to the common market (815% 
versus 4700% over the nine year period). This rate differ­
ential would seem to imply that the competitive effect and 
the commodity effect were also positive, contributing to 
Panama's overall gain.
Conclusion
The informal analysis used in this chapter indi­
cates that between 1962 and 1968 the rate of growth of GNP 
was up by at least one percentage point from the preceding 
period, i.e., 1956 to 1962 (see Table 8). Per capita gains
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(see Table 9) were also evident for the 1962-1968 period.
The gains are assumed to be the direct result of integration 
and this conclusion was supported by equation 5 in Table 11. 
The dummy variable in the equation which was used to capture 
the effects of integration on output is statistically sig­
nificant.
Trade balances and balance of payments analysis 
did not convey a perfectly clear picture. Countries like 
Guatemala and El Salvador did not show improvements in their 
balance of trade (see Table 15). These are the two more 
advanced countries of the group so these results are more 
surprising. However, the results of the balance of payments 
(see Table 14) show improvements for some countries while 
others show no improvements at all.
The results of the computations for trade creation 
and trade diversion and the distribution of benefits, pre­
sented in Tables 16 and 17 respectively, show that each 
country benefitted from integration.
The effect of integration on Panama was assessed 
using Balassa's methodology (see Table 19) and Lamfalussy's 
(see equation 3). Both approaches reveal that the effect 
on integration on Panama was positive.
In summary, integration had positive effects on the 
partners of the CACM and positive effects on Panama which 
is a nonmember.
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Regression analysis is a better method of determin­
ing the effects of trade restrictions on welfare. This 
method will be employed in the next chapter.
FOOTNOTES
1
Charles P. Kindleberger, International Economics, 
Fifth edition (111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973), p. 178.
2
Bela Balassa, "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
in the European Common Market," Economic Journal, No. 305,
Vol. LXXVII (March 1967), pp. 2-21.
^Ibid.
4
Others using disaggregated data have shown that 
manufacturing accounted for the greater proportion of the 
benefits from integration accrued to Costa Rica, El Salvador 
and Guatemala, with the smallest going to Honduras. These 
results were reported in Economic Integration in Central 
America, William R. Cline and Enrique Delgado, editors.
The Brookings Institution, 1978, p. 90.
^This analysis is drawn from D. Gately's 1974 arti­
cle in the Journal of Development Economics, Vol. I (1974), 
pp. 213-233.
^James Arthur Merrill,"The Effect of the European 
Economic Community on Trade with Denmark," Doctoral Disser­
tation, Columbia University, 1976.
7
Alexandre Lamfalussy, The United Kingdom and the 
Six: An Essay on Economic Growth in Western Europe (London:
MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1963), pp. 45-62. The thesis is that 
the growth rate of exports in the six had a strong influence 
on the ability of them to expand imports and stimulate growth. 
His analysis of the EEC shows that increases in exports had 
a pulling effect on GNP in each of the countries, except 
for a short period in France when this was not the case.
Sales (exports) will be stimulated if the country sells the 
right goods— this is the commodity composition; if the goods 
are sold in the right market (market distribution position), 
and finally, if it manages to increase the share in individual 
markets. The latter effect can overwhelm the first two.
For a complete discussion of market shares, see appendix I 
of Lamfalussy's book.
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CHAPTER VII 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Regression analysis is the basic technique for 
measuring or estimating the relationships among economic 
variables for prediction purposes. This chapter employs this 
technique in order to estimate the CACM's demand for imports. 
The purpose of the analysis is to determine from the result­
ing equations if integration altered the CACM demand for 
imports in general and for Panama in particular.
The methodology which will be used in this chapter 
is developed below.
Methodology
Ordinary least squares regression analysis is used 
to directly measure the value of trade diverted from the 
rest of the world, and also the value of trade diverted from 
Panama by the formation of the Central American Common Mar­
ket. In addition, the ordinary least squares regression and 
the results are compared with the informal analyses pre­
viously described.
Demand equations are constructed for CACM demand 
for Panamanian goods. The basic formulation suggested by the
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theory of demand is that the quantity of imports purchased 
depend on income (Y), the price of imports (P^), and the 
price of other consumable commodities ( P ^ ) o r
M = M (P^, Py, Y) (1)
For this basic demand equation, the theory of demand says 
that changes in the own price of a good will result in 
changes in quantity in the opposite direction. So the co­
efficient of P_ will be negative. The coefficient of P m y
will be positive if "all other goods" are assumed to be com­
peting or substitute goods. As income increases, the demand 
for goods and services will increase, if they are not in­
ferior goods. Thus the coefficient of Y is positive. So
9M 3M 3M 
3Pm' 3Py' 3Y
(-) (+) (+)
Available data on the dependent variable, imports 
(exports), are in value terms rather than quantity terms.
The theory of demand, however, suggests that the relevant 
measure should be quantity. Thus, to conform to theory the 
value series must be divided by the appropriate measure of 
prices to obtain the property quantity term.
The quantity is given by
where
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M = quantity of imports
V = value of imports m
= price of imports
If classes of goods are aggregated, will be an 
aggregate of the classes of goods, and will be a price 
index, and M is value in constant dollars. Dividing the 
value of imports by the price index results in an index of 
real value or value of imports in terms of base-year prices. 
This is the same process used to convert GNP to real income.
The use of real rather than current value of im­
ports may introduce serious errors into the analysis. If
the Laspeyres price index is used, I (L) = ÿ  ^ the
P ] "^Ij I^j
unit price becomes an unreliable indicator of the average
price of imports, because it assumes that the quality of the 
product does not change over the spread of the price time 
series. Clearly an improvement in the quality will under­
state the real value.
Moreover, under certain conditions, it may be ex­
tremely difficult, if not impossible, to express imports in 
real terms; examples of such "invisible items" are services, 
tourism, and banking charges.
Under these circumstances the use of current value 
is desirable for better analytical results. In such cases 
regression analysis measures the entire area of trade diver­
sion. For example. Figure 3 presents the case of a country 
such as Panama exporting to CACM.
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Figure 3
PANAMA'S EXPORTS TO CACM
= Total Panamian 
exports
S = Panamanian 
exports to 
the CACM
P1
P2
0
Q
The drop in quantity is and Price P^Pg. The
loss to Panama is equal to Producers' surplus loss
is equivalent to P^Pgaf.
If the dependent variable in the regression is 
quantity, only the trade loss measured by q^qgdf is accounted 
for. Thus, when M is current value, the regression takes 
the form
M = f(Y, Py) (2)
which will capture the full effect of a change in demand 
for imports due to changes in import price, the price of all 
other goods and/or income.
The theory of demand for imports suggests that the 
independent variable used to explain demand for imports is
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income, the price level of imports, and the price level of 
other goods as shown in equation 2. The theory of demand can 
be carried one step further to imply that the demand rela­
tionship in equation 2 may be rewritten as
M = f(PyPy, Y/Py) (3)
which explains imports by relative prices and real income.
"This transformation is based on the assumption that
individual consumers display the absence of money illusion;
that is, a doubling of all prices and money income will leave
2
the quantity demanded unchanged." In general, demand analy­
sis in international trade employs the transformed equation.
Additionally, if imports and domestic goods are not 
perfect substitutes, domestic supply will exert a direct 
impact on imports. To account for this, it is necessary to
specify a varible for the capacity of the import competing
industries in the demand function. Thus the basic demand for 
import function becomes,
M = f(S, y, P, P^) (4)
where
S = a variable that shifts the domestic supply
function with changes in imports
Y = income
P = price of the good 
Pj^  = price of the alternative good.
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If is the price of a domestic good which is not 
a perfect substitute of M, then will vanish from the
import-demand function when M is total aggregate imports.
There are several other alternatives to the import- 
demand functions which include other variables such as raw 
materials and unfinished goods, capacity-utilization, dummy 
variables, the level of foreign exchange reserves, and credit 
variables. These are of course additional explanatory vari­
ables.
Capacity utilization is an addition to the dimension 
of queues to the demand function, and gives recognition to 
the notion that queues and prices determine demand. This 
idea of queues is important as a non-price allocative device 
when demand rises. For example, if a small country is the 
supplier of primary products whose demand increases in a 
large country, it is conceivable that bottlenecks will de­
velop because of the inability of the exporting country to 
satisfy the additional demand. The large country will have 
to resort to various non-pricing distribution schemes.
These devices would include delaying deliveries, which forces 
the consumer into a queue to await servicing his order. 
Alternatively, an increase in domestic demand may serve to 
force the domestic consumer to go to the foreign sources of 
supply to avoid delays in delivery. In effect, the consumer 
pays two prices, the quoted price and the opportunity cost 
of waiting in a queue. Hence, the preferred supply source
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is the one that provides the minimum cost, including the
3
cost of waiting. So, equation 2 may be rewritten as
M = f(Y, P, Py, CU) (5)
Dummy variables or indicator variables assume values 
of one and zero. The value one is assumed if an unusual 
event such as a strike, war, or natural disaster which af­
fects imports is present. If the unusual period is absent, 
then the value of the variable is zero. Unusual events 
associated with quarterly or monthly data (such as seasonal 
variation) may be accounted for by means of a dummy variable. 
So equation 2 becomes
M = f(Y, P, P , D) (6)
The general idea of listing the various possibilities 
of independent variables in the import-demand function is to 
highlight the fact that income and prices are not the only 
pertinent variables.
Next, tariffs play a central role in the formation 
of customs unions. The demand for imports will depend not 
only on relative prices but indirectly on tariffs via their 
effects on relative prices, especially where the size of the 
tariff is large. The discriminatory tariff against nonmem­
bers is expected to result in trade diversion or a curtail­
ment of imports from the low cost producer.
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Furthermore, aggregate data for imports do not 
reflect the complex relationships that appear to govern the 
behavior of imports over the business cycle in terms of 
cyclical sensitivity. Machinery imports may be more cycli­
cally sensitive than food imports. These differences may be 
captured empirically by estimating import-demand functions 
separately for each product group or category.^
Finally, the data for the time period covered by 
this study are available in annual figures. Although quar­
terly data would provide more observations which would increase 
the degrees of freedom and, hence, the statistical preciseness 
of the results, they do not allow for enough time for adjust­
ment of import-demand for changes in the independent variables. 
Various lag techniques have been used with varying degrees 
of success to deal with the problem of adjustment. However, 
annual data represent time frames sufficiently long to allow 
for the adjustments to take place.
Annual data may not consist of sufficient observations. 
This would cause problems such as insufficient degrees of 
freedom and instability of the parameters, and make hypothe­
sis testing for reliability difficult.
Functional Form of the Equation
The general functional relations for the demand for 
imports with the two basic variables as in equation 2 is
M = f (Y/Py, P/Py)
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where
M = quantity of imports 
Y/P = real income
y
Pj^/Py = relative price of imports
This demand function is assumed to be linear as in 
equation 1 ,  and log-linear, as in equation 8.
M = a + b(Y/Py) + c(PyPy) + u (7)
log M = log a + b log (Y/P^) + c log (P^/Py) + log u
(8)
or
M = a(Y/Py)b (PyPy)° u (9)
In general, for a linear equation such as equation 7, 
a is the intercept or constant term which means that a level 
of import will result if real income is zero; b is the mar­
ginal propensity to import; and c is the import coefficient 
of relative prices, and u is the error term that reflects 
other minor effects, and is assumed not to be correlated with 
the independent variables. It is clear that in equation 7, 
income and price elasticities depend on the levels of these 
variables, and in equation 8 the elasticities are measured 
by the exponents c and b which are taken directly from the 
regression analysis.
In this study, equation 7 is rewritten as in equa­
tion 9, which is for the current values in the formal form
or
where
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M = f(Y, P D, CU) (10)m y
M = 3i + 32Y + (PyPy) + a^D + 3g CU + u (11)
M = 3^ + 3gY + a^P^ + a^Py + 3gD + 3g CU + u (12)
M = Panamanian export to the CACM 
P
Y = the income of the CACM 
P^ = import price index of Panamanian goods 
Py = price index of CACM goods 
CU = capacity utilization.
Obviously, changes in price due to tariffs will have
an impact on exports from Panama to the CACM. The bilateral
agreements between Panama and some of the CACM members pre­
viously discussed indicate that tariffs on Panamanian exports 
were declining because of trade liberalization policies.
As a result, exports from Panama to the CACM displayed a
steady rise over the time span from 1965 to 1968.
The advantage of using regression analysis for de­
termining the effects of the CACM on Panama is that the 
effects of tariffs on prices of Panamanian exports can be 
directly incorporated into the analysis. This holds true for 
determining the effects of integration on the members of 
CACM. Furthermore, the results of the regression can be 
tested for statistical significance.
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Much has been said about income, price of the domes­
tic goods, the price of imported goods, and not about imports. 
This section is concerned with the impact of the formation 
of the CACM on Panama. This can be interpreted by observing 
the changes in imports for changes in demand for Panamanian 
exports to CACM.
Ideally, all the SITC groups and some subgroups should 
be analyzed. Particular groups, such as SITC 3, mineral 
fuels, lubricants and related material; SITC 0 and 1, foods 
and beverages and tobacco, and some manufactured items that 
experienced strong increases in demand, would seem particularly 
important. On the other hand, there is no demand for SITC 4, 
animal and vegetable oils and fats. However, the lack of 
disaggregated data prevented the more detailed analysis that 
could have been done.
Three independent variables, namely income, consumer 
price index, and the import price index, are used in the re­
gression. Since the data are aggregated, the index of GNP 
is assumed to be the appropriate demand proxy, and the CPi 
and the import price index satisfactory price substitutes 
for supply prices.
The period under analysis is 1950 to 1968. The 
preintegration period from 1950 to 1959 was characterized by 
high tariffs. The integration period 1960 to 1968 represents 
a time when trade barriers were collapsing as the nations, 
with a series of aggreements and protocols, eliminated or
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reduced quotas and tariffs among themselves. It was during 
this period that the common market was formed. It meant the 
elimination or gradual reduction of tariffs among members 
and a common tariff against nonmembers.
Since prices and income are in index numbers, the 
imports from Panama are also expressed in index form. Hence, 
the coefficients of the independent variables are the per­
centage point changes of the dependent variable resulting 
from a percentage point change in each independent variable.
Computation of Trade Diversion 
This section deals with the method of computing trade 
diversion loss of Panama caused by the formation of the CACM.
The first step is to determine the coefficient of the CACM
price variable by regressing Panama's exports M^ on the
CACM P . This evidently shows the relationship between
changes in CACM prices including tariffs to changes in Pana­
manian exports to the CACM. Hence, for a given percentage 
decrease in CACM tariffs stemming from the formation of the 
common market, there will result a determinate percentage 
decrease in imports from Panama.
To facilitate computation, the tariff change is 
assumed to occur uniformly over the period 1960 to 1968. To 
obtain the hypothetical value of Panamanian exports, the 
index is cumulatively raised each year. Thus, the value of 
export trade lost by Panama per year is determined. Summing
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these losses over gives the total value of export trade loss 
for the period. The difference between actual exports and 
hypothetical exports equals the net cumulative loss in trade.
Empirical Results 
Various results of equation 12 are shown in Table 18. 
The dummy variable in the equations is designed to capture 
the effects of the bilateral trade agreement between the 
CACM and Panama. This will cover a period of 5 years, from 
1965 to 1969.
The capacity utilization variable (CÜ) puts a con­
straint on the volume of exports from Panama and it is also 
used to deal with a realistic finite supply of Panamanian 
export goods.
The "t" values of the four demand equations are 
shown in parentheses. The R-squared for each equation indi­
cates that more than 85% of the variations in the demand for 
Panamanian goods is explained by the independent variables, 
i.e., income or gross national product (GNP), import price 
(MPRICE), the consumer price index (CPI) for the CACM, energy 
consumption (ENCOM) and the dummy variable (DUM). Accordingly, 
the "t" values of the coefficients of the constant term, the 
CPI and the dummy variable are statistically insignificant 
at the 5% level of significance. The other independent vari­
ables in the equation are statistically significant. All the 
coefficients but the coefficient of the dummy variable have
TABLE 20
DEMAND FOR IMPORTS FROM PANAMA
dependent
Variable Independent Variables
Imports
From
Panama
Constant GNP Import Price CPI Energy Cons Dummy Relative
Price
r2 Dw N
(13) -267.50
(0.23)
7.68*
(1.97)
-8.13
(-1.97)
2.58
(0.28)
743.95*
(2.14)
-77.60
(-1.14)
0.93 2.22 19
(14) 35.92
(1.26)
2.64
(1.31)
-11.06*
(-2.55)
1.93
(0.38)
-0.58
(-0.49)
-1.08*
(2.36)
0.88 1.86 19
(15) 42.53
(1.74)
2.06
(1.31)
-11.92*
(-3.10)
2.06
(0.41)
1.02*
(2.38)
0.87 1.82 19
(16) 39.97
(2.06)
0.84
(0.74)
0.78
(1.61)
-8.21*
(-2.43)
0.86 2.03 19
Equations 14, 15 and 16 are log forms of equation 13.
* Indicate coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.
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correct signs. The R-squared of equation 13 shows that 
93% of the imports of Panamanian goods is explained by the 
independent variables. At 5%, the Durbin-Watson test indi­
cates that the residuals are not serially correlated.
Equation 14 is a log-linear version of equation 13. 
Only the import price and the dummy variable are significant 
at the 5% level of significance. Eighty-eight percent of 
the dependent variable is explained by the independent vari­
able, and at 5% the Durbin-Watson test is inconclusive.
In equation 15, after dropping the energy consumption 
variable of equation 14, the sign of the dummy variable was 
improved and the constant term became statistically signifi­
cant.
Using the coefficient of the import price in equa­
tion 13, the effect of a 28% change in price on the demand 
for Panamanian goods by the CACM can be computed. A 28% 
reduction in tariff among members of the CACM is equivalent 
to an increase in the import price of Panamanian goods by the 
same amount.
The following computation from equation 13 leads to 
a change in output of 2.28 (= .28 x 8.13) or 228%. The ex­
port change per year is estimated at 25.3%. The actual 
export value in 1968 was $2,786,000. Since the drop in 
import demand is 2.28, the hypothetical import was $9,138,000
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(= 2.786,000 X 3.28). Hence, the loss in trade to Panama 
in 1968 was the difference between the actual and the hypo- 
sthetical imports, or $6,352,080. The loss in trade experi­
enced by Panama was 70% of the hypothetical exports.
Equation 16 is important because the relative price 
coefficient shows that a reduction in internal CACM tariff 
increases the relative price and lowers imports from Panama. 
This suggests that Panamanian exports to Central America 
experienced some "trade diversion" in the CACM trade as 
demand shifted to partner goods.
The data in Table 21 show the effects of the dis­
criminatory tariff on the expected value of imports from 
Panama. The internal tariff reduction was 28% and the rela­
tive price coefficient of equation 16 is 8.21. Annual change 
in Panamanian exports is estimated at 25.3%. Hence, the 
export change is computed by multiplying the relative price 
coefficient by the drop in the tariff, i.e., the export 
change is 2.30 (= 8.21 x .28), or 230%. Trade diversion is 
the difference between the actual and the hypothetical ex­
ports. Thus, trade diversion for Panama is $17,282.5 over 
nine years. This is the increment in Panamanian exports 
to the CACM that was never realized because of the presence 
of a discriminatory tariff.
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TABLE 21
COMPUTATION OF TRADE DIVERSION 
($1000)
Year
Actual Value 
Of Exports
Percentage
Change
Expected Value 
Of Exports
1960 59 25.5 74.0
1961 150 51.1 226.6
1962 226 76.7 399.3
1963 449 • 102.2 907.9
1964 853 127.8 1943.1
1965 1000 153.3 2533.0
1966 2101 178.9 5859.7
1967 1844 204.4 5613.1
1968 2786 230.0 9193.8
TOTAL $9468 $26750.5
Source: Data computed from equation 16 in Table 20.
Since the reduction in tariff within the CACM was 
28% by 1968, this tariff decrease was related to a 65% de­
crease in Panamanian exports.
From the preceding analysis, it is concluded that 
from 1960 to 1968 the export loss to Panama from the common 
market was 65% of Panama's expected exports to the Central 
American Common Market. I believe that the loss of exports 
would have been more severe had the Central American Repub­
lics not formalized a series of bilateral agreements with 
Panama after integration.
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These static results are consistent with James A. 
Merrill's study on the "Effect of the European Economic 
Community on Trade with Denmark" (1976) in which the author 
concludes that the empirical tests demonstrate significant 
trade diversion from Denmark by the EEC. In addition, the 
test in this study, together with Merrill's results, confirms 
the theoretical expectation that customs unions cause losses 
of trade diversion for nonmembers.
The computation of the overall effect of integration 
is based on the relative price coefficients of equations 17 
and 19 which are based on equation 10. The equations are 
shown in Table 21.
As before, the "t" values of the equations are shown 
in parentheses. At the 5% level of significance, the con­
stant term in all the equations, the relative prices in 
equations 17, 18 and 19, plus the dummy variables in equa-r 
tions 18 and 19 are statistically insignificant. They are, 
however, statistically significant at 10%. The number of 
observations in these equations cover the period from 1950 
to 1968, or 19 years. The Durbin-Watson tests for equations 
17, 18, and 19 are inconclusive at the 5% level. R-squared 
for all the equations indicates that a high percentage of 
imports is explained by the independent variables.
All the equations were computed from "processed" 
data. These are data that were extrapolated backwards and 
forwards for years when other data could not be found (see 
the data in the Appendix).
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The results of the regression analysis and the com­
putation of trade creation are shown in Tables 22 and 23.
The coefficient of the relative price of equation 18 is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The negative 
sign of the relative price is consistent with theoretical 
expectation. Equation 18 is in log form, and, therefore, 
the coefficient is the elasticity of demand for imports.
The coefficient of the relative price of equation 18 
was used to compute the value of trade creation in the CACM 
that resulted from integration of the region from 1960 to 
1968. Since the average reduction in tariff from 1960-1968 
was 28%, the change in imports was 0.26 (= 0.92 x .28).
This was equivalent to an annual import change in demand of 
2.9%. The amount of trade creation was $959.9 million, or 
greater than expected.
The coefficient of the relative price of equation 20 
was used to compute the value of trade diversion in the 
CACM that resulted from integration of the region from 1960 
to 1968. With a 28% tax reduction the change in imports from 
the rest of the world was .08 (=0.29 x .28). This was equal 
to a yearly import change in demand of .009.%. The amount 
of trade diversion was $288 million, or 5% of actual imports.
The results of the regression analysis and the compu­
tation shown in Table 21 are consistent with the theory that 
Panama experienced the effects of trade diversion as a result 
of the formation of the CACM.
TABLE 22
CACM IMPORT DEMAND
Dependent Variable Independent Variables
Total Imports Constant GNP Relative Price Dummy R^ DW N
(17) 40.37 1.20* -0.49** 19.09* 0.98 1.42 19
(0.80) (9.18) (-1.44) (3.31)
(18) 2.74 1.37* -0.92** 0.05 0.96 1.00 19
(0.75) (8.75) (-1.41) (0.67)
(19) 40.76 1.15* —0.46 6.94 0.97 1.34 19
(0.78) (8.42) (-1.30) (1.15)
(20) 1 1.33* -0.27* 0.95 2.26 19
I (19.87) (-5.49)
W
* Indicates coefficients which are significant at the 5% level of significance.
** Indicates coefficients which are significant at 10%.
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TABLE 23
COMPUTATION OF TRADE EFFECT— TRADE CREATION 
(Million of U.S. $)
Year
Actual Value 
Of Imports % Change
Expected Value 
Of Imports
1960 $ 514 2.9 $ 499.5
1961 496 5.8 468.8
1962 552 8.7 507.8
1963 653 11.7 584.6
1964 770 14.6 671.9
1965 889 17.5 756.6
1966 937 20.4 778.2
1967 1030 23.3 835.4
1968 1046 26.9 824.3
TOTAL $6887 $5927.1
Source: Data computed from equation 18 in Table 22. The
expected value computed by discounting the actual 
value of imports by percentage change (example: 
514/1.029 = 499.5).
17.5
Although the price coefficient of imports in equation 
16 was used to compute the value of trade diversion against 
Panama, the results are not conclusive. However, the analy­
sis highlights the possibility that if the tariff discrimina­
tion were not implemented, Panama's exports to the CACM would 
have been 3.4 times greater than actual output. This is ap­
proximately 0.8% of Panama's GNP (not terribly important to 
the country's wellbeing, it would appear). The main point 
is that the formation of the CACM did impair Panama's exports 
to the region.
Overall the CACM benefitted from integration. Table 
23 shows that the actual total imports were 16% (= 6887 - 
5927.1/5927.1) greater than they would have been without a 
discriminatory tariff. Table 24, on the other hand, shows 
that total imports from the rest of the world were 5%
(= 6104 - 5816/6104) less than they would have been in the 
absence of a discrimnatory tariff. Thus, the CACM experi­
enced a net gain from integration. This result is consistent 
with previous tests for the effects of integration (except 
market shares analysis) and with the theory of customs 
unions.
The trade diversion as shown in Table 21 means that 
the drop in Panamanian output would lead to a displacement
5
of workers in the export sector. Bale dealt with trade- 
displaced workers by looking at their characteristics and 
their displacement costs.
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TABLE 24
TRADE DIVERSION 
(Million of U.S. $)
Year
Actual Value 
Of Imports % Change
Expected Value 
Of Imports
1960 $ 481 .009 $ 485
1961 459 .018 467
1962 506 .027 519
1963 580 .036 601
1964 664 .045 694
1965 754 .054 795
1966 762 .063 810
1967 816 .072 875
1958 794 .081 858
TOTAL $5816 $6104
Source: Data computed from equation 20 in Table 22. The
expected value was computed by taking the actual 
value of inputs (example 481 x 1.009 = 485).
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In this study we will be concerned solely with the 
displacement cost of labor in Panama due to integration in 
Central Ameria. We will posit that output is a function of 
labor and capital and that exports will (following Lamfa- 
lussy's® idea) have a positive effect on output. This func­
tional relationship is shown in equation 22 below.
Y = f(K, L, X) (22)
where
Y = GNP
K = Capital
L = Labor
X = Exports
A variant of equation 22 is equation 23 which shows 
the relationship between labor and output, capital, and ex­
ports.
L = f(K, Y, X) (23)
The procedure for the analysis of the displacement of 
labor and its costs is based on the results of the import 
price of equation 14. The coefficient of the import variable 
is the price elasticity of demand for Panamanian imports.
Thus, the 28% change in tariff leads to a 310% (= .28 x 11.06) 
change in quantity demanded. Next, the import elasticity 
of output (GNP) had to be determined. This was calculated
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to be 0.11 from equation 24. So the change in GNP was 34%
(= 3.10 X 0.11). Finally,the output elasticity of employment 
is 0.04 from equation 25. Thus the percentage change 
in output of 34% results in a decline in employment of 1%
(= .34 X 0.04).
Equation 24, shown in Table 25, was used to deter­
mine the effects of a change in imports (exports) on GNP in 
Panama. The "t" values are shown in parentheses. All the 
coefficients of the independent variables but the employment 
variable are statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance. Since the equation is a log-linear regression 
the coefficients are elasticities. Thus, the import (export) 
elasticity of output is equal to 0.11. The R-squared shows 
that there is almost perfect correlation between the indepen­
dent variables and the dependent variable, so that 97% of 
the change in output is accounted for by changes in the inde­
pendent variables of the equation. The Durbin-Watson test 
is inconclusive at 5%, but the R-squared shows a very strong 
correlation between the dependent variable (labor) and the 
independent variables (GNP and GFCFOR). Equation 26, which 
is the result of Cochrane-Orcutt iterative techniques, is 
not an improvement over equation 25— none of the coefficients 
are significant at the 5% level of significance. The last 
equation is another variant of equation 25. It is not a log 
linear regression. Only the constant term in this equation 
is statistically significant at 5%. The R-squared shows a
TABLE 25
CACM PRODUCTION AND PANAMANIAN LABOR FUNCTIONS
Dependent Variables Independent Variables
Constant Labor Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation
Imports from 
Panama
GNP r 2 Dw N
(24) Gross National 
Product
4.63*
(4.39)
0.80
(1.53)
0.47*
(4.01)
0.11*
(3.83)
0.97 1.43 15
(25) Labor -2.17*
(-6.40)
0.18*
(2.46)
0.04
(0.42)
0.96 1.76 15
(26) Labor -1.01
(-1.31)
0.02
(0.24)
0.03
(0.26)
0.97 1.60 15
(27) Labor 0.57*
(7.78)
-0.002
(-1.62)
0.0
(0.97)
0.97 1.39 15
Equations 24 and 25 are log forms of equation 26.
* Indicates coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.
-j
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a very high correlation between the dependent variable and 
the independent ones. The sign of the gross fixed capital 
formation variable is negative which is contrary to expecta­
tion. The Durbin Watson test, significant at 5%, shows that 
the disturbance term is not serially correlated.
The worker displacement cost and the displaced work­
ers for the period are shown in Tables 26 and 27. It should 
be noted that the cumulative displacement in labor would be 
less in the export sector because of the resumption of trade 
in 1965 between Panama and some CACM countries made possible 
by the bilateral trade agreements alluded to before.
The cost figures shown in Table 27 are very optimis­
tic because wages in manufacturing in developing countries 
tend to be higher than wages in agriculture. However, the 
analysis provides an indication of the effect of integration 
on employment and income in Panama.
Data in Table 26 show that by 1968 the total number 
of Panamanian workers displaced by the CACM was 3,636. This 
loss in employment translates to a cost of $5,809,688.06, 
as shown in Table 27.
Data for hours of work in manufacturing were available 
from 1964 to 1968. Therefore, cost figures from 1960 to 
1963 are not shown in Table 27.
There are a number of critiques of the methodology 
employed here in analyzing labor displacement costs. One 
problem is that no recognition was given to the reallocation
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TABLE 26
LABOR DISPLACEMENT 
(1000)
Year Employment Annual % Change
No. of Displaced 
Workers
1960 307 0.001 .307
1961 316 0.002 .632
1962 328 0.003 .984
1963 339 0.004 1.356
1964 338 0.005 1.750
1965 350 0.006 2.232
1966 372 0.007 2.695
1967 385 0.008 3.080
1968 404 0.009 3.636
Source; Employment figures are shown in Table 13. Computa­
tion of the annual percentage change in employment 
used equations 14, 24, and 25. Number of displaced 
workers obtained is the product of the employment 
and annual percentage change columns.
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TABLE 27
LABOR DISPLACEMENT COST
Year No. of Displaced Wages in Costs
Workers Manufacturing^
1960 307 ---- ----
1961 632 —  — —  —
1962 984 -- —  —
1963 1356 -- --
1964 1750 0.63 $2,360,232
1965 2232 0.65 3 .168,547
1966 2695 0.67 3,995,542
1967 3080 0.70 4,501,728
1968 3636 0.73 5,809,688
a
Source: Statistical Abstract of Latin America: Vol 17 (1976)
p. 160.
Note: Panamanian Labor Law requires employers to give employees
one month off every year— workers work 48 weeks per year. Hours 
of work in manufacturing from 1964 to 196 8 was 44.6, 45.5, 46.1, 
43.5, and 45.6, respectively.
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of displaced labor to other industries in the export and 
nonexport sectors. In addition, the period of unemployment 
was ignored. The lack of data for reallocated displaced 
workers and for the period of unemployment of such workers 
preclude this analysis. Thus, the analysis of displaced 
workers shown in Tables 26 and 27 overestimates the actual 
number and cost of unemployment in Panama due to the CACM.
In summary, equation 16, shown in Table 20, was 
used to compute the loss of exports in Panama due to the 
presence of the CACM. Unlike the results from using Balassa's 
and Lamfalussy's methods, regression analysis resulted in 
losses to Panama of $17.3 million from 1960 to 1968. These 
results are shown in Table 21.
The loss to Panama was not just a reduction in out­
put, but also a displacement of workers and the cost associ­
ated with such loss of employment in the export sector.
Equations 18 and 20, shown in Table 20, were used for 
trade creation and trade diversion, respectively. The re­
sults are depicted in Tables 23 and 24. Actual imports were 
$6,887 million after integration, but would have been $5,927.1 
million in its absence. So trade creation was $960 million 
or 16% greater than expected. Trade diversion, on the other 
hand, was $288 million or 5% less than expected. Thus, the 
CACM resulted in a net gain of $672 million. These results 
are consistent with the theory of customs unions discussed 
earlier.
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In an absolute sense and ignoring the effects of 
the bilateral agreements between Panama and CACM partners, 
and periods of unemployment and reallocation of displaced 
workers, the number of displaced workers was 3.6 thousand or 
about 1% of the labor force. The total associated with 
that level of unemployment is $5,809,688, which is a small 
proportion of Panama's GNP of $869 million in 1968.
FOOTNOTES
^Edward E. Learner and Robert M. Stern, Quantitative 
International Economics (Boston; Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970), 
p. 9.
^Ibid., p. 10.
^Ibid., p. 114.
^F. G. Adams, An Econometric Analysis of International 
Trade: An Interrelated Explanation of Imports and Exports of
OECD countries (Paris, OECD Publications, 1969) , p. 15.
^M.D. Bale, "Estimates of Trade Displacement Costs for 
U.S. Workers," Journal of International Economics 6 (1976), 
pp. 245-250.
^Alexandre Lamfalussy, The United Kingdom and the Six:
An Essay on Economic Growth in Western Europe (London: MacMillan 
and Co. Ltd., 1963), pp. 45-62.
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CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Central American Common Market grew out of the 
failure of political unification and was bolstered by a need 
to promote the development of the countries forming the 
union. The countries that make up the CACM are poor. In 
the early 1950s, some economists believed that the road to 
development lay in the direction of integration. It was 
argued that trade between developed and developing countries 
generally favored the developed countries. To overcome this 
disadvantage, it was suggested that the poor countries would 
have to adopt an inward-looking policy, i.e., they would have 
to import-substitute. It was felt that import substitution 
was the means to the industrialization of the poor countries 
and industrialization was equated with development.
To achieve this objective, a common market was es­
tablished in the early 1960s. There were two forces at work 
in integration, one was cooperation and the other was pro­
tection. Cooperation resulted from the removal of internal 
tariffs within the integrated area. Cooperation also in­
volved the planned allocation of integration industries among
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the partners. Protection emerged from the common external 
tariff set up against the rest of the world. Protection 
belies the pure theory of international trade argument which 
holds that free trade is superior to restricted trade. How­
ever, since the real world is far removed from the conditions 
of free trade, the perceived gains from protection associated 
with integration were the results of an alternative solution 
referred to in the trade literature as the theory of the 
second best.
In theory, before integration all exports come from 
the lowest cost producer, namely the rest of the world.
After integration all imports are assumed to flow from part­
ners. In the first instance, the result is what is generally 
referred to as trade creation, in the latter case the outcome 
is: trade diversion. The objective of the study was to analyze 
which of the two effects of integration was dominant within 
the CACM and Panama.
The actual formation of the CACM had the aid of the 
ECLA and a number of forward-looking officials who were edu­
cated abroad and who believed in taking positive economic 
steps to raise the standard of living of the people.
A number of protocols were signed during the early 
1960s and by 1962, with the ratification of the General Treaty 
by Costa Rica, the CACM was established.
The formation of the CACM was not without problems.
The poorer countries, like Honduras and Nicaragua, believed
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that they should be given preferential treatment because 
they felt capital and industries would migrate to the more 
developed countries in the region, i.e., El Salvador and 
Guatemala.
It will be remembered that data in Tables 6 and 7 
showed that in terms of GNP, Guatemala followed by El Salva­
dor appeared to be better off than the other members of the 
CACM. Outside of the CACM, Panama showed a higher degree of 
economic advancement in both GNP and per capita GNP. Within 
the common market Costa Rica had the highest per capita 
income. The data do not clearly suggest any impact of inte­
gration on income.
The data in Tables 8 and 9 showed a distinct impact 
of integration on the rate of growth of GNP and per capita 
GNP. The rates of growth for the period 1962-1968 were higher 
than rates of growth of the periods 1956-1962 and 1968-1974, 
i.e., the pre- and post-integration years.
Rates of growth disguise the underlying causes of 
the increase in income. To ascertain the effects of integra­
tion on output, the results of equation 2 for the aggregate 
production function for the CACM were analyzed. The results 
were shown in Tables 10, 11, 12 and 13. Since the coeffi­
cients of the dummy variable were statistically significant 
at the 5% level of significance, we inferred that integration 
had a positive effect on income.
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The trade balances and balance of payments of the 
Central American countries were shown in Tables 14 and 15. 
They were used to analyze the effect of integration on the 
CACM countries. Countries with relatively more favorable 
trade balances were assumed to have benefitted from integra­
tion. In that regard, Guatemala and El Salvador were the 
main beneficiaries of integration; after Costa Rica joined 
the common market, her balance of trade improved in 1964, 
but dropped steadily afterwards. In terms of the balance of 
payments shown in Table 15, the main beneficiary of integra­
tion seems to have been Costa Rica. These informal analyses 
seem to suggest improvement to the countries after integra­
tion but this conclusion cannot be categorically established 
from the data. Tables 16 and 17 showed the results of the 
income propensity to import analysis of trade creation and 
trade diversion in the CACM. Data in Table 16 showed that 
each country realized gains from integration; and Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua showed negative trade diversion. The 
welfare effects shown in Table 16 were positive for trade 
creation, but Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala mani­
fested negative welfare effects of trade diversion.
However, the net benefit for each country from inte­
gration was positive. The analysis lends support to the 
hypothesis that integration can have a positive welfare 
effect on the participating countries.
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Data in Table 17 showed the distribution of the 
gains from integration. The distribution of the benefits 
showed Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras receiving the 
largest shares. The ex post income elasticities analysis 
was used to ascertain the presence of trade creation or 
trade diversion in the CACM from integration by SITC groups 
of commodities. Data in Table 18 showed the presence of 
trade creation in intra-regional trade, except for beverage 
and tobacco, and crude materials, inedible, except fuel.
For extra-regional trade, just the opposite results were 
shown. These results are consistent with customs union theory.
Data in Table 21 showed a positive effect of the 
Common Market on Panama. The same result was obtained using 
Lamfalussy's methodology for Panama. This inconsistency with 
theory may have been caused by the bilateral agreements be­
tween Panama and Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1965. These 
agreements had the effect of augmenting Panama's exports to 
the CACM.
The use of regression analysis is more appealing bè-. 
cause the coefficients of the relative price indexes can be 
tested for statistical significance. The income elasticity 
approach lacks this feature. Although regression analysis 
is the preferred method, both tests were used to determine 
the effect of integration of the Central American Republics 
on Panama.
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Data in Table 21 showed the value of the trade loss 
suffered by Panama by the formation of the CACM. The re­
sults support the hypothesis that the formation of the cus­
toms union would have adverse effects on the rest of the 
world in the sense of reducing such trade. Data in Tables 
22 and 23 showed the value of trade creation and trade diver­
sion in the CACM. The net effect of integration was positive.
Finally, for Panama, it was necessary to analyze the 
impact of the CACM on employment in Panama. Data in Table 26 
showed the number of displaced workers and data in Table 27 
showed the later displacement costs to Panama.
It must be pointed out that this study does not 
encompass all the effects of integration on the CACM partners 
or on the outsider— Panama. This is largely because of the 
lack of data for the period preceding integration. The data 
used are aggregate figures. Disaggregate figures for SITC 
groups 1-8 were available for 1960 and onward. However, 
neither aggregate nor disaggregate data were available for 
intra/extra area trade.
Ideally, the analysis of the effects of integration 
should attempt to cover a host of other effects such as the 
various dynamic effects alluded to throughout the study but 
not analyzed because of data problems. Such an analysis 
would have been particularly meaningful if time series data 
were available.
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In the final analysis, the study has demonstrated 
that developing countries may benefit from economic inte­
gration. Whether these benefits are substantial and sustain­
able in the longrun cannot be generalized. In the case of 
the CACM, further investigation is warranted in order to 
determine the viability and the desirability of its continu­
ance. Future studies, it is hoped, will address and resolve 
these issues.
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TABLE 1
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, INDEX NUMBERS, 1963 = 100
(CACM)
Year GNP
1950 54
1951 58
1952 59
1953 63
1954 66
1955 68
1956 71
1957 74
1958 79
1959 82
1960 88
1961 88
1962 94
1963 100
1964 106
1965 112
1966 118
1967 125
1968 134
Source; Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Volume 18 (1977) 
the data are in constant dollars of 1970, parity ex­
change rate 1950-1974.
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TABLE 2
PANAMANIAN EXPORTS TO CACM, INDEX NUMBERS 1963 = 100
Year Exports
1950 37
1951 39
1952 37
1953 40
1954 48
1955 56
1956 48
1957 55
1958 51
1959 54
1960 13
1961 33
1962 50
1963 100
1964 190
1965 223
1966 468
1967 411
1968 620
Source: United Nations, Year Book of International Trade
Statistics, annual data in U.S. dollars and Intergracion 
en Cifras, SIECA.
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TABLE 3
IMPORT PRICES, INDEX NUMBER, 1963 = 100
Year Import Prices
1950 91
1951 92
1952 93
1953 94
1954 93
1955 92
1956 97
1957 99
1958 99
1959 97
1960 102
1961 102
1962 99
1963 100
1964 103
1965 104
1966 101
1967 109
1968 109
Source: United Nations, Year Book of International Trade Statistics
(1968) and other issues. Figures for Guatemala were not 
available.
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TABLE 4
CONSUMER PRICE, INDEX NUMBERS, 1963 = 100
Year Price
1950 84
1951 85
1952 86
1953 89
1954 91
1955 96
1956 96
1957 94
1958 97
1959 97
1960 97
1961 97
1962 98
1963 100
1964 103
1965 103
1966 103
1967 104
1968 107
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, 1977 Supplement,
annual data 1952-1976.
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TABLE 5
TARIFF ON IMPORTS
CACM(%)
Year Rate
1950 22
1951 26
1952 25
1953 25
1954 20
1955 23
1956 23
1957 22
1958 23
1959 24
1960 23
1961 23
1962 21
1963 19
1964 16
1965 15
1966 14
1967 12
1968 11
Source: U.N., Year Book of International Trade Statistics,
various issues.
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TABLE 6
TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
(Million of Metric Ton) 
Coal Equivalent_______
Year Energy
Consumption
1950 .24
1951 .27
1952 .35
1953 .35
1954 .32
1955 .35
1956 .31
1957 .38
1958 .47
1959 .49
1960 .50
1961 .50
1962 .50
1963 .50
1964 .50
1965 .60
1966 .70
1967 .70
1968 .80
Source: Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 18 (1977).
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TABLE 7
WEIGHTED AVERAGE INDUSTRIAL TARIFFS, 1958, AND 1968
(Percent)
Tariffs 1958 1968
Based on Import Value Weight 
Legal Tariffs
Guatemala 53.8 28.1
El Salvador 25.2 28.9
Honduras 34.4 28.5
Nicaragua 30.7 25.5
Costa Rica 52.9 28.9
Based on Consumption
Value Weights
Guatemala 79.5 59.6
El Salvador 27.7 57.4
Honduras 56.7 60.4
Nicaragua 52.5 54.9
Costa Rica 69.5 54.8
Source: William R. Cline and Enrique Delgado, ed. Economic
Integration in Central America (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 80.
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TABLE 8
CACM IMPORTS, INDEX NUMBERS, 1963 = 100
SITC 1-8
. 1,
Year
CACM
Total Extra Area
1950 34 34
1951 41 41
1952 48 48
1953 50 50
1954 57 57
1955 61 61
1956 71 71
1957 79 79
1958 77 77
1959 71 71
1960 79 82
1961 76 79
1962 85 87
1963 100 100
1964 118 114
1965 136 130
1966 143 131
1967 158 141
1968 160 137
Source: Total CACM imports appear in UN Year Book of International
Trade Statistics, 1968. Imports both total and extra for 
1960-1968 are from Integracion en Cifras, published by
STPPa . Cnai-oma 1 a _
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TABLE 9 
CACM - GNP 1970= 100
Year Total %
1953 2307 5.0
1954 2388 4.0
1955 2479 4.0
1956 2608 5.0
1957 2794 7.0
1958 2870 3.0
1959 2976 4.0
1960 3064 3.0
1961 3175 7.0
1962 3381 6.0
1963 3606 7.0
1964 3793 5.0
1965 4045 7.0
1966 4215 4.0
1967 4511 7.0
1968 4793 6.0
1969 5019 5.0
1970 5288 5.0
Source: Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 18, (1977)
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TABLE 10
INDUSTRIAL WAGE INDEX 
CACM
Year Index %
1952 48
1953 49 2.1
1954 54 10.2
1955 59 9.3
1956 60 1.7
1957 60 .0
1958 62 3.3
1959 64 7.8
1960 69 1.4
1961 70 5.7
1962 72 -2.7
1963 76 5.6
1964 78 2.6
1965 84 10,5
1966 87 3.6
1967 92 5.7
1968 96 4.3
1970 100 4.2
Source; Statistical Abstract of Latin America/ Vol. 18, (1977:
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TABLE 11
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION/ CACM 
(Million)
Year Total %
1952 240.94
1953 206.16 -0.14
1954 250.11 0.21
1955 280.62 0.12
1956 357.65 0.27
1957 386.89 0.08
1958 718.24 0.86
1959 341.33 -0.52
1960 368.14 0.08
1961 360.26 -0.02
1962 407.65 0.13
1963 474.08 0.16
1964 540.87 0.14
1965 592.96 0.10
1966 596.78 0.01
1967 677.34 0.13
1968 675.08 0.30
1969 742.95 0.10
1970 816.92 0.10
Source : International Financial Statistics (1977) Supplement,
Annual Data (1952-1976), Vol. XXX, No. 5/ May 1977.
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TABLE 12
PANAMA'S GNP
Year GNP
1960 401.9
1961 453.2
1962 495.6
1963 550.8
1964 595.5
1965 644.0
1966 702.7
1967 778.0
1968 836.1
1969 920.1
1970 1019.4
1971 1125.7
1972 1264.1
1973 1430.2
1974 1779.7
1975 2128.2
Source: International Financial Statistics (1977) Supplement,
Annual Data (1952-1976), Volume XXX, No. 5, May 1977.
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TABLE 13
LABOR SUPPLY FOR PANAMA 
(Million)
Year Labor
1960 .307
1961 .316
1962 .328
1963 .339
1964 .350
1965 .372
1966 .385
1967 .404
1968 .420
1969 .433
1970 .436
1971 .449
1972 .464
1973 .487
197 4 .462
Source; ILQ Yearbook of Labor Statistics (various issues)
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TABLE 14
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
(Panama - Million)
Year Gross Fixed Capital Formation
1960 61.4
1961 80.4
1962 85.4
1963 96.6
1964 87.8
1965 100.1
1966 142.1
1967 152.7
1968 173.5
1969 200.7
1970 255.6
1971 300.7
1972 383.0
1973 410.3
1974 422.1
1975 567.2
Source: International Financial Statistics (1977) Supplement,
Annual Data (1952-1976), Volume XXX, No. 5, May 1977.
